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FIRST PART: A STRATEGY FOR EUROPE 
For six months, the members of the Reflection Group have been working on the 
European Council mandate to pave the way for the revision of the Treaty at the 1996 
Conference and any other improvements in the Union's operation, in a spirit of openness 
and democracy. 
We feel it has been our task not only to establish an annotated agenda for the 
Conference but also to set in motion a process of public discussion and explanation 
regarding the thrust of the changes to be made. 
THE CHALLENGE 
Men and women of Europe today, more than ever, feel the need for a common project. 
And yet, for a growing number of Europeans, the rationale for Community integration is 
not self-evident. This paradox is a first challenge. 
When the European Communities were established some forty years ago, the need for 
a common design was clear because of the awareness of Europe's failure over the first 
half of this century. 
Now, almost half a century later. the successive enlargements of the Union, the 
expansion of its tasks, the very complexity of its nature and the magnitude of the 
problems of our times, make it very difficult to grasp the true significance of, and the 
continuing need for, European integration. 
Let us accept that complexity is the price that Europe pays to protect our plural identity. 
But we firmly believe that this creation of Europe's political ingenuity, which cannot take 
the place of but is now an inseparable counterpart to the Union's Member States, from 
which its main political legitimacy flows, has been making an invaluable contribution o 
its own: peace and prosperity based on a definition of common interests and action tha 
is the result not of power politics but of a common body of law agreed by all. 
Today Europe has changed, partly because of the Union' success. All those Europea 
nations rediscovering their freedom wish to join, or to cooperate more closely with, th 
European Union. Yet, in Western Europe there is a growing sense of public disaffectio 
despite the Union's contribution to an unprecedented period of peace and prosperity. 
We therefore need to explain clearly to our citizens why the Union, which is so attractiv 
to others in Europe, remains necessary for us too. 
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One reason is that the world outside Europe has also changed. Goods, capital and 
services nowadays flow globally in an increasingly competitive market. Prices are set 
worldwide. The prosperity of the Europe of Today and Tomorrow depends on its ability 
to succeed in the global marketplace. 
The end of the cold war may have increased .the overall security of Europe. But it has 
also brought greater instability in Europe. 
Furthermore, high levels of unemployment, external migratory pressures, increasing 
ecological imbalances and the growth of international organised crime have stimulated 
a public demand for greater security that cannot be satisfied by Member States acting 
alone. 
In an increasingly interdependent world, that reality poses new challenges and opens 
up new opportunities for the Union. 
THE RESPONSE 
However, we are not starting from scratch. Over the last five years, Europe has adjusted 
successfully to changing times. In 1990, the Community welcomed in the 17 million 
Germans who had been living on the other side of the Berlin Wall. 
The Maastricht Treaty succeeds in mapping out the path of adjustment by the 
Community to changing times: it establishes a European Union closer to its citizens, 
setting out the principle of subsidiarity; it establishes the path towards a single currency 
and puts forward a strategy of economic integration based on price stability that 
strengthens competitiveness and makes for growth in our economy. lt reinforces social 
and economic cohesion and provides for high standards of environmental protection. lt 
opens the way for a common foreign and security policy and attempts to bring about an 
area of freedom and of public security. 
Since then, in very difficult economic circumstances, the European Union has been able 
to take timely decisions on progress in line with its new needs: it has agreed to the 
outcome of the Uruguay Round, it has managed to reach agreement on the Union's 
finances up to 1999 and it has been enlarged to bring in three new members. 
Yet that is not enough. European Heads of State or Government have already identified 
the steps necessary to develop Europe's strategy for these changing times: the 1996 
Conference, the transition to a single currency, the negotiation of a new financial 
agreement, the possible revision or extension of the Brussels Treaty setting up the WEU 
and, lastly, the most ambitious target, enlarging the Union to bring in associated 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, including the Baltic States, Cyprus and Malta. 
That next enlargement provides a great opportunity for the political reunification of 
Europe. Not only is it a political imperative for us, but it represents the best option for 
the stability of the continent and for the economic advancement not just of the applicant 
countries but for this Europe of ours as a whole. That enlargement is not an easy 
exercise. Its impact upon the development of the Union's policies will have to be 
assessed. lt will require efforts both by applicants and present Union members that will 
have to be equitably shared. lt is therefore not only a great chance for Europe but also 
a challenge. We must do it, but we have to do it well. 




The Union cannot tackle all the steps in that European strategy at once, but it does not 
have any time to waste. The Heads of State or Government have personally taken 
responsibility for agreeing on a European agenda for carrying out this plan, which will 
only become a reality if it finds democratic backing from Europe's citizens. 
THE 1996 CONFERENCE 
The 1996 Conference is an important, but just one step in this process. 
The Maastricht Treaty already foresees that a Conference should be convened in 1996 
with a limited scope. This scope has subsequently been enlarged at various European 
Councils. 
The Heads of State or Government have identified the need to make institutional 
reforms as a central issue of the Conference in order to improve the efficiency, 
democracy and transparency of the Union. 
In that spirit, we have tried to identify the improvements needed to bring the Union up 
to date and to prepare it for the next enlargement. 
We consider that the Conference should focus on necessary changes, without embarking 
on a complete revision of the Treaty. 
Against this background, results should be achieved in three main areas: 
- making Europe more relevant to its citizens; 
- enabling the Union to work better and preparing it for enlargement; 
- giving the Union greater capacity for external action. 
I. The citizen and the Union 
The Union is not and does not want to be a super-state. Yet it is far more than a 
market. lt is a unique design based on common values. We should strengthen these 
values, which all applicants for membership also wish to share. 
The Conference must make the Union more relevant to its citizens. The right way for the 
Union to regain the commitment of its citizens is to focus on what needs to be done at 
European level to address the issues that matter to most of them such as greater 
security, solidarity, employment and the environment. 
The Conference must also make the Union more transparent and closer to the citizens. 
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Promoting European values 
Europe's internal security rests on its democratic values. As Europeans we are all 
citizens of democratic States which guarantee respect for human rights. Many of us 
think that the Treaty must clearly proclaim these common values. 
Human rights already form part of the Union's general principles. For many of us they 
should, however, be more clearly guaranteed by the Union, through its accession to the 
European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The idea of a 
catalogue of rights has also been suggested, and a provision allowing for the possibility 
of sanctions or even suspending Union membership in the case of any state seriously 
violating human rights and democracy. Some of us take the view that national 
governments already provide adequate safeguards for these rights. 
Many of us think it important that the Treaty should clearly proclaim such European 
values as equality between men and women, non-discrimination on grounds of race, 
religion, sexual orientation, age or disability and that it should include an express 
condemnation of racism and xenophobia and a procedure for its enforcement. 
One of us believes that the rights and responsibilities we have as citizens are a matter 
for our nation states: reaching beyond that could have the opposite effect to that 
intended. 
Some of us also thought it worthwhile to examine the idea of establishing a Community 
service or European "peace corps" for humanitarian action, as an expression of Union 
solidarity; such a service could also be used in the event of natural disasters in the 
Union. Furthermore, some of us recommend that the Conference should examine how 
to better recognize in the Treaty the importance of access to public service utilities 
("services publics d'interet general"). 
We believe that Europe also shares certain social values which are the foundation of our 
coexistence in peace and progress. Many of us take the view that the Social Agreement 
must become part of Union law. One of us believes that this would only serve to reduce 
competitiveness. 
Freedom and internal security 
The Union is an area of free movement for people, goods, capital and services. Yet 
people's security is not sufficiently protected on a European scale: while protection 
remains essentially a national matter, crime is effectively organized on an international 
scale. Experience of the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty over the last few years 
shows that opportunities for effective European action are still very limited. Hence, the 
urgency for a common response at European level, following a pragmatic approach. 
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We all agree that the Conference should strengthen the Union's capacity to protect its 
citizens against terrorism, drug trafficking, money laundering, exploitation of illegal 
immigration and other forms of internationally organized crime. This protection of 
citizens' security at European level must not diminish individual safeguards. For many 
of us, this requires further use of common Institutions and procedures, as well as 
common criteria. lt is also for national parliaments to exercise political scrutiny over 
those who administer such common action. 
Many of us take the view that, in order to act more efficiently, we need to put fully 
under Community competence matters concerning third country nationals, such as 
immigration, asylum and visa policy, as well as common rules for external border 
controls. Some would also like to extend Community competence to combating drug 
addiction and fraud on an international scale, and to customs cooperation. 
For some of us, however the key to success has to be found in a combination of 
political will and more effective use of existing intergovernmental arrangements. 
Employment 
We know that job creation in an open society is based on sound economic growth and 
on business competitiveness, which must be fostered by initiatives at local, regional and 
national levels. We believe that, in the European Union, the main responsibility of 
ensuring the economic and social well being of citizens lies within the Member States. 
In an integrated economic area such as ours, however, the Union also has a 
responsibility for setting the right conditions for job creation. lt is already doing so by 
the completion of the internal market and the development of other common policies, 
with a joint growth, competitiveness and employment strategy which is achieving 
positive results, and with its plan for Economic and Monetary Union. 
We all agree that the provisions on the single currency which were agreed at Maastricht 
and ratified by our parliaments must remain unchanged. 
While we are all aware that jobs wilt not be created simply by amendments to the Treaty, 
many of us want the Treaty to contain a clearer commitment on the part of the Union 
to achieving greater economic and social integration and cohesion geared to promote 
employment, as well as provisions enabling the Union to take coordinated action on job 
creation. Some of us advised against writing into the Treaty provisions which arouse 
expectations, but whose delivery depends primarily on decisions taken at business and 
state-level. In any case, most of us stress the need for stronger coordination of economic 
policies in the Union. 
Environment 
In essence, the environment has crossborder effects. Protection of the environment is 
an objective involving our survival not only as Europeans but also as inhabitants of the 
planet. Therefore the Conference should examine how to improve the capacity of the 
Union to act more efficiently and to identify whenever that action should remain within 
the Member State. 
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A more transparent Union 
Citizens are entitled to be better informed about the Union and how it functions. 
Many of us propose that the right of access to information be recognized in the Treaty 
as a right of the citizens of the Union. Suggestions have been made on how to improve 
the public access to Union's documents which should be examined by the Conference. 
Prior to any substantial legislative proposal, information should be duly gathered from the 
sectors concerned, experts and society in general. The studies leading up to the proposal 
should be made public. 
When such a proposal is made, national parliaments should be duly informed and 
documents supplied to them in their official languages and in due time to allow proper 
discussion from the beginning of the legislative process. 
We all agree that the Union law should be more accessible. The 1996 Conference should 
result in a simpler Treaty. 
Subsidiarity 
The Union will be closer to the citizen if it focuses on what should be its tasks. 
This means that it must respect the principle of subsidiarity. This principle must therefore 
not be construed as justifying the inexorable growth of European powers nor as a pretext 
for undermining solidarity or the Union's achievements. 
We believe it necessary to reinforce its proper application in practice. The Edinburgh 
Declaration should be the basis for that improvement and some of us believe that its 
essential provisions should be given Treaty status. 
11. Enabling the Union to work better and preparing it for enlargeme"..t 
The Conference should examine the ways and means to improve the efficiency and 
democracy of the Union. 
The Union must also preserve its decision-making ability after further enlargement. 
Given the number and variety of the countries involved, this call for changes to the 
structure and workings of the institutions. lt may also mean that flexible solutions will 
have to be found, fully respecting the single institutional framework and the "acquis 
communautaire n. 
The European Council, consisting of the Heads of State or Government of the Member 
States and the President of the Commission, is the highest expression of the Union's 
political will and defines its general political guidelines. Its importance is bound to 
increase in view of the Union's political agenda. 
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Improving democracy in the Union means both fair representation in each of the 
institutions, and enhancing the European Parliament, within the existing institutional 
balance, and the role of national parliaments. In this context, it is recalled that, 
according to the Treaty, a uniform electoral procedure for the European Parliament 
should be established. Many of us believe that the European Parliament's procedures are 
too numerous and complex and therefore favour reducing them to three: consultation, 
assent and codecision. 
The current codecision procedure is over-complicated and we propose that the 
Conference simplify it, without altering the balance between the Council and the 
European Parliament. Many of us also propose that the Conference should extend the 
scope of the codecision procedure. One member believes, however, that the European 
Parliament gained extensive new powers at Maastricht and therefore should grow into 
these powers before seeking more. 
National parliaments should also be adequately involved. This does not imply that they 
have to be incorporated into the Union's institutions. For many of us its decision-making 
procedures should be organised in a way which allows national parliaments adequately 
to scrutinise and influence the positions of their respective governments in the decision-
making of the Union. Some of us suggest a more direct involvement of national 
parliaments: in this context, the idea of a newly established advisory committee has been 
suggested by one of us. Cooperation among national parliaments and between them and 
the European Parliament should also be fostered. 
The decision-making processes and working methods of the Council of Ministers will 
need review. The Union must be able to take timely and effective decisions. But 
efficient decision-making does not necessarily mean easy decision-making. The Union's 
decisions must have popular support. Many of us believe greater efficiency would be 
enhanced by more qualified majority voting in the Council, which, according to many, 
should become the general procedure in the enlarged Community. Some of us believe 
that this should only be countenanced, if democratic legitimacy is improved by a 
reweighting of votes to take due account of population. One of us opposes extension 
on principle. 
We consider the role of the Council Presidency to be crucial for the efficient management 
of the Union's business and we support the principle of rotation. But the present system 
applied to an enlarged Union could become increasingly disjointed. Alternative 
approaches combining continuity and rotation should be examined further. 
We agree that the Commission should retain its three fundamental functions: promotion 
of the common interest, monopoly of legislative initiative and guardianship of Community 
law. Its legitimacy, underlined by its parliamentary approval, is based on its 
independence, its credibility, its collegiality and its efficiency. The composition of the 
Commission was designed for a Community of six. We have identified options for its 
future composition in order to preserve the Commission's ability to fulfil its functions in 
view of an enlarged Union that may extend to more than twice the number of Member 
States having negotiated the Maastricht Treaty. 
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Broadly, one view within the Group is to retain the present system for the future, 
reinforcing its collegiar.ty and consistency as required. This option would allow all 
members to have at least one Commissioner. Another view is to ensure that greater 
collegiality and consistency be attained by reducing the Commissioners to a lesser 
number than Member States and enhancing their independence. Procedures should be 
established to select those members on grounds of qualification, and commitment to the 
general interest of the Union. When deciding the future composition of the Commission. 
the Conference may also examine the possibility of establishing senior and junior 
Commissiorws. . 
··some of us believe that the Committee of the Regions has to play an Important 
role in Community legislation and that the consultative role of this body should be better 
used. 
Europe's achievements depend on its ability to take decisions together and then to 
comply with them. An improvement in the clarity and quality of Community legislation 
would contribute to this, as would better financial management and a more effective 
fight against fraud. The Conference should also improve the key role of the Court of 
Justice especially in ensuring uniform interpretation of and compliance with Community 
law. 
Ill. Giving the Union greater caoacitv for external action 
The Maastricht Treaty has established the Union's Common Foreign and Security Policy. 
In our opinion. this was the right decision at the right time. at a time with the end of the 
cold war increasing the burden of responsibility on the European Union to lay the 
foundations of peace and progress in Europe and elsewhere. 
The current possibilities offered by the Treaty have provided some positive results. We 
believe. however. that the time has come to provide this common policy with the means 
to function more effectively. 
The Union today needs to be able to play its part on the international stage as a factor 
for peace and stability. Although an economic power today. the Union continues to be 
weak in political terms. its role accordingly often confined to financing decisions taken 
by others. 
Common Foreign Policy 
We think that the Conference must find ways and means of providing the Union with a 
greater capacity for external action, in a spirit of loyalty and mutual solidarity. lt must 
be capable of identifying its interests. deciding on its action and implementing it 
effectively. Enlargement will make this task more difficult, but also makes it even more 
imperative. 
This means that the Union must be able to analyse and prepare its external action jointly. 
With that in mind, we propose the establishment of a common foreign policy analysis 
and planning unit. For most of us, this unit should be answerable to the Council. Many 
of us also think that it should be recruited from Member States, Council Secretariat and 
Commission and be established within the institutional framework of the Union. Jt has 
been suggested by ·some that the head of the unit. whose functions could eventually 
merge with those of the Secretary General of the WEU, should be the Secretary General 
of the Council. 
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lt also calls for the capacity to take decisions. To that end, we propose that the 
Conference examines how to review decision-making and financing procedures in order 
to adapt them to the nature of foreign policy, which must reconcile respect for the 
sovereignty of States with the need for diplomatic and financial solidarity.lt should be 
commonly agreed whether and if so how to provide for the possibility of flexible 
formulae which will not prevent those who feel it necessary for the Union to take joint 
action from doing so. Some members favour the extension of qualified majority voting 
to CFSP and some others propose to enhance the consultative role of the European 
Parliament in this area. 
The Union must be able to implement its external actions with a higher profile. We have 
examined several possible options for ensuring that the Union is able to speak with one 
voice. Some of us have suggested the idea of a High Representative for the CFSP, so as 
to give a face and a voice to the external political action of the Union. This person should 
be appointed by the European Council and would act under precise mandate from the 
Council. Many of us have stressed the need for a structured cooperation between the 
Council, its Presidency and the Commission, so that the different elements of the 
external dimension of the Union they are responsible for function as a coherent whole. 
This greater political role for the Union in the world should be consistent with its current 
external economic influence as the premier trading partner and the premier humanitarian 
aid donor. The Conference will have to find ways of ensuring that the Union's external 
policy is visible to its citizens and the world, that it is representative of its Member 
States and that it is consistent in its continuity and globality. 
European security and defence policy 
The multifaceted challenges of the new international security situation underline the need 
for an effective and consistent European response, based on a comprehensive concept 
of security. 
We therefore believe that the Conference could examine ways to further develop the 
European identity, including in the security and defence policy field. This development 
should proceed in conformity with the objectives agreed at Maastricht, taking into 
consideration the Treaty provisions that the CFSP shall include all questions related to 
the security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, 
which might in time lead to a common defence. 
The Conference will have to take account of the reality that, in the view of NATO 
members, such a development should also strengthen the European "pillar" of the 
Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic link. The Alliance continues to guarantee the 
collective defence of its members and plays a fundamental role in the security of Europe 
as a whole. Equally, the right of States which are not members of the Alliance to take 
their own defence decisions must be respected. 
Many of us feel that the Conference should consider how to encourage the development 
of European operational capabilities, how to promote closer European cooperation in the 
field of armaments and how to ensure greater coherence of action in the military field 
with the political, economic or humanitarian aspects of European crisis management. 
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Against this background, many of us want to further strengthen relations between the 
EU and the Western European Union (WEU), which is an integral part of the 
development of the Union. 
In this regard, several options for the future development of this relationship have already 
been suggested within the Group. One option advocates a reinforced EU/WEU 
partnership while maintaining full autonomy of WEU. A second option suggests that a 
closer link should be established enabling the Union to assume a directing role over WEU 
for humanitarian, peacekeeping and other crisis management operations (known as 
Petersberg tasks). A third option would be the incorporation of these Petersberg tasks 
into the Treaty. As a fourth option, the idea of a gradual integration of WEU into the EU 
has been supported by many of us: this could be pursued either by promoting EU/WEU 
convergence through a WEU commitment to act as implementing body of the Union for 
operational-military issues, or by agreeing on a series of steps leading to a full EU/WEU 
merger. In the latter case, the Treaty would incorporate not only the Petersberg tasks 
but also a collective defence commitment, either in the main body of the Treaty or in a 
Protocol annexed to it. 
In this context, the idea that the IGC examines the possibility of including in the revised 
Treaty a provision on mutual assistance for the defence of the external borders of the 
Union has been put forward by some members. 
lt will be for the Conference to consider these and other possible options. 
Europe and democracy are inseparable concepts. To date, all the steps in the 
construction of Europe have been decided by common accord by the democratic 
governments of its Member States, have been ratified by the national parliaments and 
have received popular support in our countries. This is also how we shall construct the 
future. 
We realize that this reflection exercise by the Group is only one step in a public debate 
initiated and guided by the European Council. We hope that this public and joint 
exercise between our nations will lead to renewed support for a project which is more 
than ever necessary for Europe today. 
SN 520/95 (REFLEX 21) EN 
- X -
SECOND PART: 
AN ANNOTATED AGENDA 
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I. REFORM OF THE EUROPEAN UNION: A COMMITMENT TO THE FUTURE 
A. WHY REFORM?: MANDATE AND CHALLENGES 
1. In addition to the mandate contained in the Treaty on European Union (TEU) and the 
commitments subsequently entered into by the Council and the European Councils, all 
of which were aimed either at completing the work of Maastricht or at dealing with 
specific institutional issues raised as a result of the most recent enlargement or 
preparing adequately for the next one, there are further substantive reasons for 
holding the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference UGC 96). 
The Group has identified two fundamental reasons, namely improving the functioning 
of the Union on the one hand, and, on the other, creating the conditions to enable it 
to cope successfully with the internal and external challenges facing it, and notably 
the next enlargement. 
The mandate of the Conference 
2. The mandate of the 1996 Conference, the legal basis for which is Article N of 
the TEU, was in part set by the Treaty itself and its accompanying Declarations. 
Hence: 
• The fifth indent of Article B makes clear that, to maintain in full the "acquis" 
communautaire and build on it, the Conference will have to analyse to what extent 
"the policies and forms of cooperation introduced by this Treaty may need to be 
revised with the aim of ensuring the effectiveness of the mechanisms and the 
institutions of the Community"; 
• Article 189b(8) provides for a possible extension of the eo-decision procedure to 
other areas; 
• Article J.4(6) and Article J.1 0 provide for possible revision of the CSFP "with a 
view to furthering the objective of this Treaty and having in view the 1998 
deadline laid down in the modified Brussels Treaty of the WEU". 
• Declaration No 1 sets out the possibility of introducing energy, tourism and civil 
protection as new titles into the Treaty establishing the European Community; 
• Finally, Declaration No 16 requests that consideration be given to the question of 
introducing a hierarchy of Community acts into the TEU. 
3. In the framework of the negotiations for the accession of Austria, Finland, Norway and 
Sweden, various institutional issues arose which were dealt with at the Brussels 
European Council, in the "loannina compromise" and at the Corfu European Council. 
All those issues (reform of the institutions in general, including the weighting of votes 
and the number of vote:.. for a qualified majority in the Council, the number of 
members of the Commission and "any other measures necessary to facilitate the work 
of the institutions in a spirit of democracy and openness and guarantee their effective 
operation with a view to enlargement") will also have to be dealt with at the IGC 96. 
SN 520/95 (REFLEX 21) EN 
- 1 -
As a result of inter-institutional agreements between the European Parliament, the 
Council and the Commission, questions relating to budgetary discipline and procedure 
and the implementation of Community acts (committee procedure) have been added 
to the Conference agenda. 
4. lt goes without saying that this planned agenda is likely to be supplemented, in 
accordance with Article N, by other topics raised by the member States or the 
institutions. Notwithstanding that possibility, in the light of the experience acquired 
after the entry into force of the Treaty on European Union, and taking into account the 
challenges and difficulties posed in particular by the prospect of further enlargement, 
the Cannes European Council felt that the discussion in the Reflection Group should 
focus on a number of priorities to enable the Union to respond to its citizens' 
expectations. These priorities are: 
to analyse the principles, objectives and instruments of the Union, with the new 
challenges facing Europe; 
to strengthen common foreign and security policy so that it can cope with new 
international challenges; 
to provide a better response to modern demands as regards internal security, and 
the fields of justice and home affairs more generally; 
to make the institutions more efficient, democratic and open so that they are able 
to adjust to the demands of an enlarged Union; 
to strengthen public support for the process of European integration by meeting 
the need for a form of democracy which is closer to the citizens of Europe, who 
are concerned about employment and environment questions; 
to put the principle of subsidiarity into practice more effectively. 
The new challenges facing Eurooe 
Internal challenges 
5. A key challenge facing the Union internally is the need to ensure that European 
construction becomes a venture to which citizens can relate. 
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Most Europeans consider that community integration is an invaluable asset, assuring 
peace in an increasingly unstable continent and prosperity in a global market. 
Nevertheless, the growing popular dissatisfaction with public matters in general 
affects also the European construction, partly due to economic, social, political and 
institutional reasons: a high level of unemployment, which is particularly serious in the 
case of young people and. the long-term unemployed; environmental degradation; 
social rejection and exclusion; major changes in our demographic structures, which 
undermine the European social model; the crisis in the political contract between 
representatives and those represented; the European Union's growing complexity and 
the lack of information on, and understanding of, its raison d'etre; finally, the worrying 
phenomenon of organized crime (drug trafficking, money laundering, terrorism). 
As a result, there is a growing call for public security that cannot be met by States 
acting alone, and that is not receiving a satisfactory response from the Union. This 
is due to the gaps or shortcomings in the Union's mechanisms and to the lack of 
political will to remedy these. 
External challenges 
6. Other major challenges are a result of the profound changes taking place outside the 
Union as the end of the century approaches. 
The magnitude of some of the challenges which can only be met by adopting an 
equally broad, global approach is demonstrated by questions such as major political 
instability in the European region following the end of the cold war, despite greater 
overall security; strong migratory pressures which are particularly acute in Europe; 
risks of ecological imbalances which the Union and the member States cannot afford 
to ignore, etc., and an increasing globalization of the economy which highlights 
Europe's loss of some of the comparative advantages gained through its social and 
technological innovations. 
The challenge of enlargement 
7. The next enlargement represents both a political imperative and a new opportunity for 
Europe, but at the same time it presents the Union with a major challenge requiring 
an adequate response: 
firstly, in the framework of the Intergovernmental Conference, through the reforms 
designed to improve the Union's functioning in general and institutional reform in 
particular; 
secondly, in view of the impact which enlargement will have on applicant 
countries and on the Union. 
The next enlargement will be a great opportunity for Europe and will also be different 
from the previous ones because of the large number of applicant countries and the 
heterogeneity of their political, economic and social situations. To ensure that the 
next enlargement does not weaken, change the nature of or actually break up the 
Union, the reforms needed to cope with the challenges involved must first be made. 
The enlargement negotiations cannot begin until the 1996 Conference has been 
concluded satisfactorily. The success of the former thus depends on the success of 
the latter. 
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The responses 
8. As we have just seen, the new situation inside and outside Europe raises questions 
and requires the European Union and the Member States to provide responses which 
will ensure greater political stability while simultaneously allowing economic 
development and the proper· social climate to be maintained within an open, global and 
competitive economy. In other words, responses which will enable the European Union 
to continue acting as a crucial factor for peace and prosperity on our continent. 
Some of Europe's responses to these challenges have already been identified, as in the 
case of Economic and Monetary Union, achievement of which is a priority for Europe, 
as agreed in the Maastricht Treaty and ratified by the national parliaments. The Group 
strongly feels that the EMU should carry on its process of implementation in 
accordance with what was agreed. 
9. The next enlargement also constitutes a response to the challenges of security and 
political and economic stability in Europe. However, in order to achieve it, reforms of 
the Union are required in some areas and, very significantly, in the Union's institutions. 
Other possible responses have already been formulated, as stated in the introduction, 
by the Treaty itself or by subsequent European Councils. lt is the Reflection Group, 
however, that has been given the task of identifying and producing concrete 
proposals. The Group shares the points which follow. 
10. As stated above, the Union's principal internal challenge is to reconcile itself with its 
citizens. Therefore, enhancing its legitimacy in their eyes has to be the prime task of 
the coming reform. 
The achievement of this aim will depend on a clear definition of the Union's objectives, 
i.e. the joint goals sought, the credibility of common policies and the cooperation 
machinery designed to attain those objectives (or, to put it another way, the suitability 
of the instruments for the purpose of achieving the objectives set) and the 
preservation of the Union's internal cohesion. 
• The Group has come to the conclusion that the coming reform must equip 
the Union with the necessary means to give priority to the problems which are 
of the greatest concern to the citizens of Europe. A majority of personal 
representatives include unemployment, social exclusion, lack of internal security 
and environmental degradation among the problems to be tackled as a matter of 
urgency. 
A further response to the challenge posed by citizens' alienation from the Union 
must be sought in a correct and systematic application of the principles of 
democracy, efficiency, transparency, subsidiarity and solidarity in the 
European Union. 
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Those principles should be put into practice through concrete measures, such as 
improved application of the subsidiarity principle ("who does what?"); Community 
legislation concentrating on essentials; promotion of competitiveness on a 
European scale; simplification (of texts and procedures); effective enforcement of 
the rights of the Union's citizens; promotion of equality between men and women; 
greater political responsibility for the Institutions combined with increased 
accountability on their part; the fight against fraud; greater transparency in the 
functioning of the Institutions, which should be given the means to take decisions 
with the broadest possible backing from citizens; and closer involvement of 
national parliaments in the Union's tasks. 
The mechanisms for maintaining solidarity and cohesion within the Union must 
also be adapted and reinforced. 
11. On the other hand, the responses to the challenges posed by the profound changes 
which have taken place outside the Union, in the political and security context as well 
as in the economic and commercial sphere, need to be based on reinforcement of the 
instruments set up to achieve the highest possible levels of external stability and 
security. 
The key task here, therefore, is to take all the steps necessary to provide 
the Union with a genuine, external identity that will enable it to promote its values 
and defend its interests. This will clearly only be possible if the Common Foreign 
and Security Policy really functions, with full consistency being ensured between 
the political and economic aspects of the Union's external action. 
In view of the new challenges that have arisen with regard to security in Europe, 
it is also necessary to enable the Union to continue moving towards the eventual 
framing of a common defence policy, which might in time lead to a common 
defence. 
B. PRINCIPLES AND OBJECTIVES 
The objective to be achieved 
12. A prime objective to be achieved can be established from a mere enumeration of the 
challenges and the responses to them: maintenance of strong European integration 
and cooperation in this new end-of-the-century context, as, together with the 
organizations responsible for European security and national policies, they are both a 
guarantee of peace and prosperity for the citizens of the Union. 
The Group emphasizes that this guarantee of prosperity and peace is not perpetual and 
that it would be a grave error to underestimate the Community's main contribution to 
the Member States and their citizens, namely a shared view of life that has ruled out 
war as a means of settling differences and has decided to follow resolutely the path 
of growth respecting the environment, competitiveness and employment, promoting 
stringency in public finances and in combating inflation as the best way to meet 
citizens' demands. The Group accordingly feels that the Conference must endorse and 
reinforce the Union's common objectives, which aim at peace and freedom, internal 
and external security, democracy, protection of the human rights and prosperity for 
the citizens of Europe and solidarity between them. 
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Flexibility. its rationale and its limits 
13. The success of this ever-closer Union among the peoples of Europe depends, as we 
have seen, on its ability to meet citizens' demands. However, it must also be based 
on common principles which must be reaffirmed. They inspire the common core 
which characterizes the Community as an entity based on the rule of law, and in 
particular involve: 
maintenance and development of the "acquis communautaire" as a whole, as 
provided for by Article B of the Treaty. Maintenance of the "acquis 
communautaire" should not however prevent the necessary adjustments from 
being made in order to respond to new situations. Neither, as we shall see below, 
should it prevent flexible formulae from being found on a case-by-case basis and 
where necessary to enable new stages of integration to be entered upon at 
different paces, without the objectives of a common project being jeopardized in 
any circumstances; 
consolidation of a single institutional framework as the best guarantee for the 
consistency of the Union's action and a means of enabling the citizen to clearly 
identify those responsible for areas where the decisions taken clearly affect him. 
lt should be emphasized that respect for these two principles should constitute an 
adequate response to the growing need for consistency of action by the Union as a 
whole, irrespective of the outcome of the Conference on the options of a bicephalous 
Union/Community structure, division into Treaty "pillars", or unification. 
14. On the basis of this common core, the prospect of enlargement and the existence in 
the Union of differentiated integration arrangements, raises the question of flexibility 
and its limits in relation to the outcome of the Conference and the approach to be 
adopted to enlargement. An unequivocal answer to the question "What do we want 
to accomplish together?" will clarify what the reform is expected to achieve. If a 
common will is ultimately found to be lacking, that should not prevent those who wish 
and even need to make the Union progress from doing so subject to clear limits. lt will 
have to be considered on a case-by-case basis and when necessary what should be 
the allowed flexibility that will make it possible for the Union to manage diversity 
without jeopardizing the "acquis" and the common objectives. 
15. Therefore, the Group rejects any formula which could lead to an a la carte Europe. As 
regards the guidelines to allow flexibility, there is a large majority view sharing the 
following criteria: 
flexibility should be allowed only when it serves the Union's objectives and if all 
other solutions have been ruled out and on a case-by-case basis; 
differences in the degree of integration should be temporary; 
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no-one who so desires and fulfils the necessary conditions previously adopted by 
all can be excluded from full participation in a given action or common policy; 
provision should be made for ad hoc measures to assist those who want to take 
part in a given action or policy but are temporarily unable to do so; 
when allowing flexibility the necessary adjustments have to be made to maintain 
the "acquis", and a common basis should be preserved to prevent any sort of 
retreat from common principles and objectives; 
a single institutional framework has to be respected, irrespective of the structure 
of the Treaty. 
Several members, while agreeing with most of the above, stress that such flexible 
arrangements in the Union should only be possible when agreed by all, as in the past. 
Some members believe that, whereas such arrangements should in principle be 
temporary, they need not always be so, especially where they do not concern "core 
disciplines" of the EC. 
16. lt should be pointed out however that the degrees of flexibility admissible are different 
both under each of the three "pillars" and also in the case of the present Member 
States and those acceding on next enlargement: 
Whereas derogations must not be allowed in the Community "pillar" if they 
jeopardize the internal market and create discriminatory conditions for 
competitiveness, CFSP and some Justice and Home Affairs issues enable a greater 
degree of flexibility (see below, when treating those subjects ). 
The formulae applicable to the acceding countries should in principle be transitional 
arrangements based on consideration of their specific circumstances and can only 
be more closely defined when their respective accessions are negotiated. 
Nevertheless, a "critical mass" of "acquis" essential for accession has to be 
preserved in spite of any flexible arrangement. 
C. CONTEXT AND TIMETABLE 
1 7. The Conference is not an isolated event. lt forms part of a broader context parallel to 
the Conference in some respects and subsequent to it in others. This context 
includes, inter alia, the following elements which will form Europe's agenda up to the 
end of the century: 
analysis of the impact of enlargement on policies and resources; 
renegotiation of the own resources system and the financial perspective for 2000 
and beyond, depending on the previous point among other things; 
transition to the third stage of Economic and Monetary Union; 
debate on the WEU bearing in mind the 1998 deadline; 
negotiations on enlargement and its ratification. 
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18. The comprehensive examination of the best way to manage Europe's agenda up to the 
end of the century has been taken on personally by the members of the European 
Council, i.e. Europe's highest level of political leadership. All the above points, 
although having their own momentum, are clearly linked in one way or another to the 
reform of the Union; it will therefore be necessary to consider the relationship between 
them, so that they can be achieved without obstructing one another. 
To sum up, only once the 1996 Conference has reached a satisfactory conclusion will 
it be possible for the other tasks to be tackled on more solid bases, although this does 
not prevent appropriate preparatory work from being carried out at the same time. 
The Group therefore considers that the Conference should start and conclude its 
proceedings in good time in order to enable the other important elements on the 
schedule to be dealt with properly. 
19. We have already seen that enlargement is a response by the Union to the new 
challenges facing the continent of Europe. However, as we shall see below, it is also 
a challenge in itself. This is because of its threefold impact on an institutional system 
conceived for the six founding States, on the internal and external security of the 
Union and on the need to preserve and strengthen the Community as an entity based 
on the rule of law. lt is furthermore possible that enlargement will also have a definite 
impact on Community policies and give a new dimension to the problem of the Union's 
resources. 
20. Therefore, the Group above all agrees in stressing that enlargement must take place 
but it has to be duly prepared so that it is successfully achieved. To avoid 
enlargement or have it miscarry would create a serious crisis not only in the applicant 
countries but also in the present Union. 
Who will be acceding to the Union when enlargement takes place? lt is clear that 
accession should be open to all European countries wishing to accede which comply 
with the criteria laid down at the Copenhagen European Council. Each case must be 
dealt with on its own merits during the negotiations. However, the aim of the 
Reflection Group is to identify the reforms desirable and sufficient to enable the Union 
to incorporate associated Central and Eastern European countries, including the Baltic 
States, Cyprus and Malta. 
When? In accordance with the conclusions of the Essen European Council, 
negotiations with the associated States of Central and Eastern Europe, including the 
Baltic States which fulfil the above criteria, can only start after the Conference has 
ended. In accordance with those of the Cannes European Council, Cyprus and Malta 
will start six months after the end of the Conference taking into account its outcome. 
How? The next enlargement will have to combine a global approach to meet common 
demands with flexible adjustment structures which make it possible in each case to 
adopt an appropriate time scale for the process of full incorporation of applicants into 
the present Union's common policies. 
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21 . The question of whether and if so how common policies should be revised in the light 
of enlargement is not within the Group's mandate. There is, however, agreement on 
the need to maintain the "acquis communautaire" and build on it (Articles Band N) as 
a basic principle for the present Member States and as a major guide for the applicant 
countries. This should not prevent progressive implementation of the "acquis" by the 
applicant countries. 
A broad majority of members of the Group favours the separation of the Conference 
exercise from the study of the impact of enlargement in relation to future development 
of common policies, for the following three reasons: firstly, a revision of policies does 
not require amendment of their respective legal bases; secondly, the effect of 
enlargement on common policies will not be immediate but will be spread over time 
in accordance with the model for enlargement which in general seems possible for the 
next set of applicants; finally, it is not appropriate to combine two such politically 
sensitive exercises. 
Some members consider that the analysis of the impact of the enlargement on policies 
and resources should be developed simultaneously with IGC. One member stresses 
that, each of the EU's major tasks from now until the end of the century are aspects 
of the same overall strategy, the results of which will be judged with an assessment 
of all the efforts, concessions and opportunities involved in the common project. 
D. WHAT KIND OF CONFERENCE? 
The scope of the Conference. The need for transparency 
22. The Group considers that the Conference should formulate adequate responses to the 
above challenges. This means that on top of improving the present functioning of the 
Union it must make the reforms necessary to incorporate into the Union a greater 
number of Member States than was the case in earlier enlargements. The forthcoming 
enlargement will make the Union much more heterogeneous than at present as regards 
differences in size of countries, variety of languages, disparity of income levels and 
differing sensitivities with regard to Foreign Policy or Justice and Home Affairs. 
The Maastricht Treaty foresees a specific scope for the Conference. As seen above, 
this scope has subsequently been enlarged at various European Councils. The Heads 
of State or Government have identified the need to make institutional reforms as an 
important issue of the Conference in order to improve the efficiency, democracy and 
transparency of the Union. According to these elements, the Group has convened that 
the scope of the Conference should be targeted to deliver the necessary results 
without opening a general revision of the Treaty. 
SN 520/95 (REFLEX 21) EN 
- 9 -
23. The Group favours comprehensive treatment of all the Conference issues as part of 
a single exercise. A single Conference keeping a general vision of the essential issues 
and which is not split seems the most appropriate method of achieving consistent 
results able to cope with challenges facing the Union. 
24. lt should also be emphasized that the necessary results can be achieved by amending 
the Treaties and also by improving the Union's procedures and working methods. The 
Cannes European Council has recommended the Group to bear in mind the advantages 
of seeking improvements in the working of the Institutions that do not require any 
amendment to the Treaties and can thus enter into force without delay. lt should be 
pointed out, however, that in the report often the proposals for practical 
improvements refer to matters that, according to alternative options, should be subject 
to Treaty reforms. The choice between them is not of technical but political nature, 
since they express a different level of political ambition for the Union. 
25. lt is also considered that the proceedings of the 1996 IGC should be as transparent 
as possible. The concerns of the Institutions, the organizations representing civil 
society and the future applicants must be given an appropriate hearing. The public 
must also be provided with all important information enabling it to follow closely a 
discussion which is directly relevant to citizens' fundamental concerns. This is 
essential, not only so that citizens can feel that they are participating in the 
construction of Europe but also because their opinions are essential for carrying out 
the reform. 
26. The Group is aware that, if citizens consider the reform inappropriate or insufficient 
or feel that they were not involved in it by means of adequate information, it will run 
the risk of not being approved. As the reforms resulting from the Conference are an 
essential part of Europe's agenda until the end of the century, the Group stresses the 
importance of holding a Conference the content and course of which meets the 
expectations on the basis of which it was convened. We consider that there is 
therefore an obligation to achieve sufficient results, and this obligation must be met 
by the Parties to the Conference. 
27. In the light of the above points and of its mandate, the Group considers that the 
Conference should confine itself to its own specific aims, namely realizing the (legal 
or practical) reforms to enable the Union to meet the current challenges facing Europe, 
continuing and building on the achievements of Maastricht and preparing the ground 
for the forthcoming enlargement. 
The Conference will moreover form part of an open process. lt is an important step 
in the process but will certainly not be the last. The Union will continue to develop 
in the future after the 1996 Conference. 
28. Against this background, the Group without seeking to limit the Conference's 
sovereign power, recommends that results should be achieved in three main areas: 
Making Europe more relevant to its citizens; 
Enabling the Union to work better and preparing it for enlargement; 
Giving the Union greater capacity for external action. 
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11. THE CITIZEN AND THE UNION 
29. The Group considers that a key element, not only for an understanding of the reasons 
for reform of the Treaty but also in order to guarantee the success of the Conference, 
is to place the citizen at the centre of the European venture by endeavouring to meet 
his expectations and concerns, that is to say, to make Europe the affair of its citizens. 
Therefore, serving the citizens interests and perspectives for the future should be the 
main guiding principle for the envisaged reform. 
30. The Group believes that there are European common values that the Union should 
protect and promote. They are the basis of our democracies, of our security and are 
also present in the feeling of belonging in the citizens. Essential elements are to be 
found in respect for fundamental rights, non-discrimination, clarification of the rights 
and obligations of both citizens of the Union and third-country nationals in the Union. 
Furthermore, the citizens' concern about greater security, employment, environment, 
transparency and a Union closer to them should be properly taken into account by the 
Union. This is all developed under this heading. 
A. PROMOTING EUROPEAN VALUES 
Human rights and fundamental rights 
31. A basic approach in this area would, in the first place, consist in spelling out the 
general principle of respec for fundamental rights laid down in Article F.2 and making 
it more workable. This p1 :iple clearly applies "erg a omnes", i.e. covers all persons 
within the Union whether Citizens of the Union or citizens of third countries. 
32. In this connection reference has been made by some to the possibility of expressly 
including in Article F2 an obligation of the Member States to respect human rights and 
fundamental freedoms and add that non-compliance would prompt the Union to take 
suitable action. Such an explicit statement would enhance the Union's image as a 
community of sh::-.• ed values. lt is important to ensure this both for present members 
and for those t-'H~o will accede at the next enlargement. 
33. lt is generally felt within the Group that during the current process of European 
construction, and above all in the run-up to enlargement, there is an urgent need to 
ensure full observance of fundamental rights, both in relations between the Union and 
the Member States and between States and individuals. The majority opinion within 
the Group is that an Article should be inserted into the Treaty providing for penalties 
which could go as far as suspension of the rights inherent in membership in the case 
of any State which commits a serious and repeated breach of fundamental human 
rights or basic democratic principles. Reference was even made to the possibility of 
expulsion. 
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However, most representatives were wary about agreeing to such a possibility as they 
thought it would be unnecessary if suspension of rights achieved the desired effects 
and felt there might be a danger that this would call into question the irreversibility of 
membership of the Union. 
34. As for the possibility of complaints by individual natural persons concerning human 
rights, the great majority of members of the Group makes the point that there is at 
present an inconsistency in the fact that, while the Member States are subject to the 
monitoring mechanisms of the European Convention on Human Rights, the Institutions 
of the Union and Community law remain exempt from such control. The protection 
of individual human rights has hitherto been ensured solely by the Court of Justice in 
Luxembourg. 
lt is a widely held view within the Group that the Union, if it takes on legal personality, 
or the Community at any rate, should accede to the European Convention on Human 
Rights. lt is recalled here that the Court of Justice has been asked for an opinion on 
this question. 
Opposing this majority feeling, some members regard Union or Community accession 
to the European Convention on Human Rights as unnecessary. 
35. Independently of the above, some members point out the advantages of including a 
Bill of Rights, either in the enacting terms or in an Annex or in the Preamble. The 
Group has looked at a comparative study of fundamental rights guaranteed in the 
Member States, which was made by the Council Secretariat and shows the technical 
difficulties of such an exercise despite the fact that all Member States guarantee the 
protection of human rights on their territory. 
At European Union level, from the point of view of individual protection, it is felt by 
those members that only accession by the Community to the European Convention 
and/or inclusion of a Bill of Rights in the enacting terms would confer additional 
protection either by the Luxembourg and Strasbourg Courts in the first case, or only 
by the Luxembourg Court in the second. 
lt has also been noted that the implications for the Union of the various proposals in 
relation to fundamental rights will need to be carefully studied by the Conference. 
Some members do not see the usefulness of including a Charter of Fundamental 
Rights in the Treaty, since all Member States already guarantee such rights on their 
territory. 
An intermediate view would accept inclusion in the preamble to the Treaty - thereby 
producing no direct legal effects but obtaining a high political profile - of a catalogue 
of the rights and obligations of the citizen compiled by bringing together all those 
scattered throughout the various provisions of the Treaty. 
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36. A large majority of the Group stresses the need to incorporate in title VIII of the EC 
Treaty the Social Agreement as an expression of common european values so that a 
proper social climate may accompany economic integration. One member will not 
agree with that incorporation, since he believes it will reduce competitiveness. 
37. Some members of the Group referred to other forms of recognition in this area. 
Among such ideas was the possibility of including in the Treaty socio-economic rights 
and more specifically incorporating the European Social Charter, the right to 
employment, the right to a healthy environment. Even the idea of including in the 
Treaty the prohibition of the death penalty has been suggested by some members. 
38. Various representatives also proposed that the citizens of third countries established 
in the Union be given a special status with certain rights (right of free movement and 
right of residence). Some members have made it conditional upon the existence of a 
common immigration policy. 
Non-discrimination 
39. With a view to the Union embodying European common values further, the Group 
analysed the following possibilities: 
• A general clause prohibiting discrimination (in addition to the one prohibiting 
discrimination on grounds of nationality in Article 6) extending beyond nationality 
notably to grounds of gender, race, religion, disability, age and sexual orientation. 
• The strengthening and extension to all areas not just of equal pay for equal work 
pursuant to Article 119, but also of the general principle of equality between men 
and women, which should be formulated positively in the Treaty and not simply 
as a result of prohibiting discrimination. In this context some members favour a 
reference in the Treaty regarding the integration of a gender perspective in all 
policies and programmes in the Union. 
• Express condemnation in the Treaty of racism and xenophobia (including explicit 
reference to anti-semitism) and intolerance by means of a provision similar to the 
one proposed in 1993 by the European Parliament. 
• Special consideration for disabled persons both by referring to them in the 
non-discrimination clause in Article 6 of the TEU and by a provision in one of its 
chapters. In the latter case, some feel that a safeguard clause should be provided 
making it possible to limit any disproportionate economic consequences which 
might derive from such a provision. 
All these options received majority support within the Group subject to a more detailed 
assessment of their legal and economic implications by the Conference. One member, 
however, felt that new or increased Community references in these sensitive areas 
were unnecessary, and that such rights were best secured in a national context. 
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CitizenshiP of the Union 
40. The Group notes that introduction into the TEU of the principle of citizenship of the 
Union - in addition to and not instead of national citizenship - by Article B, 
third indent, and its development in Articles 8 to Se was intended as a response to the 
need to involve citizens more closely in the process of European construction. 
However, it also recognizes that this purpose was viewed differently in the various 
Member States; while in most of them the concept of citizenship increased the feeling 
of belonging to the Union, in some, by contrast, it was not readily understood that 
citizenship of the Union was intended to be complementary to, rather that to replace 
national citizenship. 
41. lt is logical that this variety of situations should be reflected in the Group's attitudes. 
The broad majority of the Group regards citizenship of the Union as an essential 
aspect of making the Treaty acceptable to European public opinion, and they 
therefore strongly support its development. This could be achieved, for example, 
by deepening the specific rights of citizens of the Union already included in the 
Treaty (achieving unrestricted freedom of movement and residence, completing 
diplomatic and consular protection in third countries), by the inclusion of new 
rights, and also through simplification of the Treaty articles relating to citizenship. 
A specific right to information on Union's matters and how it functions should be 
granted to the citizens. 
Opposing this majority view, some members point out that citizenship of the Union 
is perceived as a threat to national identity in some Member States and that they 
do not think it appropriate to develop either the content or the essence of the 
concept. 
The Group suggests that the Treaty should make even more clearly that citizenship 
of the Union does not replace national citizenship. 
42. Some members have drawn the Group's attention to the positive effects on the feeling 
of belonging which would be achieved by abolishing use of the passport for the 
purpose of crossing its internal borders. 
43. The Group also discussed the idea of a European voluntary-service "peace corps" for 
humanitarian actions. A sizeable majority of the representatives favour this in principle 
and note that it would foster a feeling of solidarity and belonging to the Union among 
young people. A proposal was also made by some Members that the peace-corps' 
tasks include assisting Member States to deal with major natural disasters in the Union 
(floods, fires, earthquakes, etc.). The point is, however, made that the procedure for 
implementing such an idea might raise difficulties which would have to be resolved but 
which the Group could not discuss in detail. 
SN 520/95 (REFLEX 21) EN 
- 14-
Public service utilities 
44. 
B. 
A majority is in favour to consider during the IGC the reinforcement of the concept of 
public service utilities ("services publics d'interet general") as a principle 
supplementing market criteria. lt has been pointed out that in modern economies, a 
number of services (such as the supply of electricity and water, postal services, 
education, telephone and some forms of public transport) are supplied on the basis 
that they must meet certain criteria such as universal availability which should be 
guaranteed irrespectively of the public or private nature of the supplier. Therefore it 
is the consumer's access that should be protected instead of the nature of the 
supplier .. According to some members the Treaty should contain better and more 
complete provisions concerning the role of public services and services of general 
interest so as to garantee tha the need fer an impretted eempetitiveness and 
.Jeuenable sest does net affect t e availability, the quality and the universality of the 
services provided to the citizen. 0 hers believe that the general interest would best be 
served by maintaining the existing rovisions of the Treaty which, they believe, ensure 
an appropriate balance between mpetition policy and the need for public service 
utilities. 
FREEDOM AND INTERNAL SECURITY 
General considerations 
45. Consolidation of internal security within an area of free movement without internal 
frontiers is one of the principal challenges currently facing the Union. Accordingly, as 
requested by the Cannes European Council, the Group has given priority to this 
aspect. Thus: 
the Group considers that there is a clear demand on the part of the public for 
greater security for citizens within the Union in the face of phenomena such as 
terrorism and other forms of organized crime (drug trafficking and others); 
it is also felt that, in the context of a single market, an open society and the 
abolition of the Union's internal frontiers in accordance with the Treaty, the State, 
acting in isolation, cannot fully guarantee the internal security of its citizens since 
such phenomena clearly have an international dimension. There is an obvious 
contradiction between the effective international organization of such crime and 
the national character of the main instruments used to combat it, which explains 
their limited effectiveness; 
citizens are also calling for better handling of the challenge posed to the Union by 
the growing migratory pressures to which it is subject, and whose size and 
diversity demands common management. The exploitation of illegal immigrants 
is a problem which should be countered by action on a European scale; 
finally, the prospect of forthcoming enlargement implies a qualitative change in the 
need to guarantee the internal security of citizens of the Union more effectively. 
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Critical analysis of cooperation in the fields of justice and home affairs 
46. In view of the above, the Group has analysed the provisions and operation of Title VI 
of the Treaty and, whilst recognizing that JHA cooperation has been in force for a very 
short time and has been a step forward compared with the previous situation, it has 
concluded unanimously that the magnitude of the challenges is not matched by the 
results achieved so far in response to them. 
4 7. A broad majority, while admitting the influence of a lack of running-in of this new 
Title and of the largely inter-governmental component of the matters regulated by it, 
consider that neither these nor the alleged lack of political will alone explain the scant 
results in this area. The problem is rather that some provisions of this Title are 
inadequate and clearly deficient in operation, as stated in the reports by the 
Commission and the European Parliament on the operation of the Treaty. 
However, some members referring to political difficulties in giving up national 
sovereignty in this area have pointed out that the lack of progress is not necessarily 
attributable to the intergovernmental nature of cooperation and that improvements in 
the present complex structure could solve many of the present problems. 
48. For the great majority there is a threefold explanation for this state of affairs: 
Lack of objectives and of a timetable for achieving them. Instead of placing 
emphasis on consolidation of an area of freedom and security in which there are 
no internal frontiers and where persons can move freely - the goal at which all 
action should be targeted - Article K. 1 merely lists areas of common interest. 
Definition of the objectives pursued would allow the specification of needed 
means and actions with greater accuracy. This would clarify for citizens any 
doubt which might currently exist on action contemplated or on the final goal 
sought. Furthermore, the limits of the various common interest areas are not 
clearly differentiated from Community powers aimed at the same objective (e.g. 
free movement of persons). This entails an overlapping of actions and a risk of 
"contamination" between "pillars". The possibilities for improvement ("passe re lie") 
have proved ineffective. In fact, the unanimity rule and the need for national 
ratification make the "passerelle" very difficult to use. 
Neither are the instruments of this Title, which are similar to those of Title V 
except that the nature of the subject matter is very different, regarded as 
appropriate: external policy is rarely normative and requires flexibility of action, 
whereas matters relating to the security of citizens require legal protection and, 
therefore, a legislative framework. Still, some members consider that joint action 
may prove a specially useful instrument in certain cases. Others state that 
directives could adapt well to the JHA sector. lt is also pointed out that 
Conventions are put through an extremely slow approval procedure and that it 
would be helpful if they could enter into force between Member States that have 
ratified them once a certain number of ratifications has occurred. 
Finally, the same majority considers that a true institutional driving mechanism is 
lacking. Complex working structures, spread out over five different negotiating 
levels - one sometimes being superimposed on the other, thereby contributing 
towards the blocking of decisions - are not - and here the view coincides with 
that of the minority group- the most appropriate instruments for making progress 
in this area. 
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Ways of achieving greater efficiency 
49. For the large majority, the Conference should improve the objectives and the 
instruments in this area of the Treaty. Many members favour a pragmatic approach 
in order to identify where there is need of further use of common institutions and 
criteria (Commission's non-exclusive right of initiative, control by the European 
Parliament and the Court of Justice, use of the majority rule in some instances, 
without prejudice to the appropriate use of unanimity in particularly sensitive areas) 
and where the full use of Community competence is required: 
These members consider that the field of police and judicial cooperation, both civil 
and criminal, must be developed by means of closer intergovernmental 
cooperation, at least for a certain period. In the meantime, within the Union 
serious consideration should be given as to whether it should henceforth be 
considered admissible to exempt "political" crime from extradition between 
Member States and it might be useful to lighten the procedure provided for in 
Article K.9 ("crossover"). There has also been a suggestion that a specific legal 
basis be incorporated in the Treaty to enable actions to combat drug trafficking. 
lt has further been pointed out that it would be desirable for Member States' 
penal codes to include a harmonized rule classifying fraud against the Community 
budget as an offence punishable by comparable penalties. 
Better cooperation on those lines requires improvements to legal instruments 
(conventions can be too unwieldy; in some cases, they should be replaced or 
allowed to enter into force once ratified by a majority) or to the role of the 
Institutions (generalized - but shared - initiative for the Commission, consultation 
of the European Parliament and judicial control by the Court of Justice). 
Also, within this tendency, many members agree in identifying, as an area which 
ought to be brought under Community competence, everything to do with the 
crossing of external frontiers: arrangements for aliens, immigration policy, asylum 
(ruling out asylum among citizens of the Union) and common rules for external 
border controls. Moreover, since other aspects of the crossing of external 
frontiers, such as the format for visas and the common visa list, are already 
addressed under the first "pillar", it is thought that introduction of Community 
control would give greater coherence of the Union's external action in this area, 
an essential requisite for effectiveness in these matters. 
50. Others believe that the current separation of "pillars" is essential in order to respect 
intergovernmental management of these matters that are so closely linked with 
national sovereignty. For them, consequently, the principle way of improving the 
operation of Title VI is to find practical improvements which reinforce cooperation. 
51 . The entire Group agrees on the need to reduce the number of preparatory levels, and 
many also urge the need to strengthen the General Secretariat of the Council in these 
areas. 
52. The idea has been put forward that the European Union should explore ways of 
cooperating on more structured basis with Council of Europe in the fight against 
drugs. 
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53. The Group agrees that the national parliaments and the European Institutions should 
intensify their relations on justice and home affairs. lt has been suggested in this 
connection that COSAC or an ad hoc interparliamentary commission could facilitate 
the exchange of parliamentary information on the subject. The idea of a High 
Consultative Council made up of two representatives of each of the national 
parliaments was also presented as having a special value for this area. 
54. Various members of the Group propose the incorporation of Schengen into the 
European Union by means flexible arrangements (see above, chapter 1.8). Others 
consider this to be examined in view of the Conference progress on Justice and Home 
Affairs. 
55. As regards the arrangements for aliens, some members, as indicated in the previous 
section, would like to see the Union introduce a common status for legally resident 
third-country nationals, whilst others point out that this would require the precondition 
of an overall common immigration policy. 
C EMPLOYMENT 
56. The Group stresses the urgent need to meet the challenge of job creation, in response 
to a pressing demand from Europe's citizens. 
57. Increased competitiveness - which is encouraged by Europe's integration - is the key 
to job creation. However it must be acknowledged that, on the one hand, this takes 
place above all through enterprises located at local level; on the other hand, States 
continue to be the bodies mainly responsible for ensuring economic and social 
cohesion and helping people Jiving on the fringe of society. This being so, the Union 
cannot ignore the economic and social effects of national policies. Although the Union 
sees no miraculous cure for unemployment, it can coordinate and mobilize efforts in 
a common direction. The Group therefore considers that it must continue to follow 
the course set out in the White Paper on Competitiveness and in the process for 
examining the employment problems which was initiated after the Essen European 
Council and which has already been the main item on the agenda of the latest 
European Council meetings. 
lt is also agreed that employment is not nowadays a sectoral policy but an objective 
which must be strengthened and also the global result of the Community's policies. 
In this context, Article 2 of the TEC states that the task of the single market, EMU and 
all policies is to promote a high level of employment and of social protection. There 
are currently several policies which may make a particular contribution to that 
endeavour, in particular policy on competition, the environment, structural funds, 
education and research. • 
lt is therefore considered appropriate that the Commission, ECOFIN and the Social 
Affairs Council should continue to follow the recommendation thatthey devote special 
attention to this subject. Their monitoring, coordinating and commonly reporting work 
should result in a framework for common strategies and strengthening of the Union's 
economic and social features, reflected in the broad guidelines of economic policies 
as referred to in Article 1 03 of the TEC. 
Some members suggest that competitiveness should be mentioned in Article B of the 
Treaty. 
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58. A large majority of the Group propose that the objective of job creation be 
strengthened in the legal bases for the above mentioned policies. In any case, many 
members consider that the Community should carry out an efficiency audit of its 
proposals and of the implementation of its policies to determine their job-creating 
capacity in accordance with Article 2. 
For some members, job creation should be included among the tasks refered to in 
Article 3 of the Treaty. 
59. Several members go further and support inclusion in the TEU of a chapter on 
employment policy. In this view, according to some a Committee on Employment with 
the same rank as the Monetary Committee should be created to monitor the effect of 
Union policies and funds with regard to the impact on employment. This would imply 
the development of the Union's economic and social integration in full respect to the 
EMU provisions. 
60. From an opposite view, some members do not consider that introducing new 
employment policy provisions into the Treaty is either necessary or that it would help 
to improve competitiveness or job creation; they underline that job creation is the 
result of greater competitiveness, flexibility of the economy and reducing bureaucratic 
burdens. They further believe that employment policy is a matter for Member States 
to decide in the light of their individual circumstances. In this view, at the Unic~··s 
level, job creation should be a matter for practical improvements of the ways and 
means to coordinate national policies. 
D THE ENVIRONMENT 
61 . With regard to the environment, the Group stresses the pressure being brought by 
public opinion for greater respect for the limits imposed by the environment and 
sustainable development. 
62. Some members have pointed to the need to state more clearly that environment and 
sustainable development are priority objectives of the Union. Hence, environmental 
considerations should be integrated with other sectoral policies, e.g. agriculture in 
terms of environmental conservation. The Group thinks priority should be given in the 
Conference to taking account of the environmental dimension in Community policies. 
63. A number of possible proposals have been made within the Group in this context: 
incorporation in the Treaty of the agreements reached at the Rio Conference so that 
Community policies are geared to a sustainable development; possible inclusion of the 
environment in Article 36 of the Treaty (restrictions on imports), Article 39 (objectives 
of the common agricultural policy), Article 74 (transport), Article 129b and the 
following Articles (trans-European networks), and consideration of extending the 
possibilities offered to the Member States by Article 1 00a(4) for laying down higher 
national standards; more involvement of the EP through eo-decisions on these matters; 
inclusion in each proposal of an environmental impact assessment. 
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64. From another point of view, it has been pointed out that a large part of environmental 
legislation in each Member State is of Community origin and that in the first place the 
considerable body of legislation already in force should be properly implemented. 
Means to strengthen implementation and enforcement should be considered, without 
necessarily reforming the Treaty. In particular, the Conference should examine how 
to improve the capacity of the Union to act more efficiently and to identify whenever 
that action should remain within the Member States. 
65. A majority of members is prepared to consider extensions of qualified majority voting 
system in this area. However, some members pointed to the limits which application 
of the principle of sufficient means should impose if the exceptions to qualified 
majority voting in this area were to be abandoned. Stress was also laid on the 
quasi-constitutional nature of such exceptions in that they affect areas highly sensitive 
for the sovereignty of the Member States or have major financial implications at 
national level. 
66. In connection with the environmental concern, one member suggested the idea of 
strengthening the nuclear safety provisions of the Euratom Treaty. One member 
suggested the inclusion in the Treaty of a reference to the gradual phasing out of the 
use of nuclear energy. However, lt was noted by others that nuclear energy actually 
provided up to 75% of some member States' energy supply and that it is seen by 
many of their citizens as the cteanest way of producing energy. 
E A MORE TRANSPARENT UNION 
67. The Group agrees on the need to make Union affairs more accessible and 
comprehensible to the general public. The concept of "transparency" serves that 
purpose and covers different aspects (many of which do not require any amendment 
to the Treaties): 
• The Group has examined the possible simplification and clarification of the 
workings of the Institutions and recommends that institutions make better use of 
publicity, information and consultation methods, paying special attention to 
facilitating the work of national parliaments. There should be more advanced 
notice of Commission proposals. The Group favours the practice of issuing "Green 
Papers". lt is further thought that the increasingly frequent use of lnterinstitutional 
Agreements, which are recognized by all to be useful, should be accompanied by 
appropriate general dissemination and public notification of their contents. 
• Application of the principle of subsidiarity contributes to increase transparency. 
(see below). 
• Changes in the Council's organization and working methods will have to take into 
account, inter alia, the aim of greater transparency. Here, in addition to the 
question concerning the publicizing of the Council's activity, it is recommended 
that individuals be allowed more information and the clarity and quality of 
legislative texts be improved. Various members have referred to recommendations 
on this point in the Koopmans Report which they feel to be relevant. 
• Some representatives are in favour of inclusion in the TEU of the general principle 
of access to documents of the Union. They think that guaranteeing this principle 
by secondary legislation or political undertakings would not be sufficient and that 
there is a need for a legal basis in the Treaty so that citizens and national 
parliaments are assured of more direct access to such documents. Others prefer 
to maintain and develop this principle through a Commission and Council Code of 
Conduct. 
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68. The Group also feels in general that it is necessary to simplify as far as possible the 
actual text of the Treaty so that its contents are clearer, easier to understand and 
therefore accessible to citizens interested in examining and studying it. To this end, 
the Secretary General of the Council has upon request of the Group presented a paper 
on possible ways of simplifying and clarifying the text of the Treaty without altering 
its contents. 
An initial examination of this interesting report has led the Group to the following 
tw" conclusions: 
On the scope of the operation to be carried out, all representatives could agree, 
on a minimal simplification process involving deletion of all obsolete provisions and 
the renumbering of Articles. Some members do not think it advisable or 
appropriate to go beyond such simplification, as it seems unlikely that this could 
be achieved without altering the substance or balance of the Treaty. However, 
the majority favours more sweeping options which deliver as a result a simpler 
Treaty. Those options mean a reform of the structure of the Treaty that only the 
Conference can decide. 
Therefore, the discussion on simplification of the Treaty is not a technical matter 
which can be separated from a decision on its contents. However, a working party 
answerable to the Conference could examine the issue of formal simplification, 
and its conclusions together with those on the substance could be the subject of 
final agreement at the Conference. 
Some memt-.1rs insist that if there is to be that working party, its mandate should 
be decideo dS soon as possible. 
F SUBSIDIARITY 
69. The Group stresses the importance of correct application of the principle of 
subs1diarity and proportionality enshrined in Article 3b of the Treaty and confirmed by 
an lntarinstitutional Agreement on its implementation. 
Subsidiarity imposes not only a legal but also a behavioural obligation. 
Correct application of this principle must avoid two misuses: that of subsidiarity 
remaining an abstract principle without practical effect and that of it becoming 
in practice an instrument for systematically limiting the powers of the Union. lt is felt 
that the principle of subsidiarity should serve as a guide to the proper exercise of the 
powers shared between the Community and the Member States and avoid the1r 
misuse either to excess or the contrary. Subsidiarity cannot be used as an excuse for 
lack of solidarity or for the renationalization of common policies. Nor can it be an alibi 
for systematically increasing the Community's tasks. For these reasons, most 
members of the Group do not feel it advisable to amend Article 3b of the Treaty but 
think it necessary to ensure that it is properly exercised in practice. 
70. lt is also thought by some members that there is a need for more effective control 
over application of this principle by those Institutions responsible for watching over 
the Treaties: the Commission by "ex-ante" control and the Court of Justice by 
"ex-post" control. 
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In this sense various representatives have insisted that on the basis of the Edinburgh 
Declaration a Protocol on subsidiarity should be incorporated to the Treaty. 
Also, one member proposes stepping up control on subsidiarity through a new legal 
procedure for the national parliaments before the Court. Others favour further political 
supervision. In this context, it has been suggested to increase the "ex-ante" control 
through the consultation of a High-Level Advisory Committee consisting of two 
members of each national parliament, which would report on whether subsidiarity is 
being correctly applied. Furthermore, the idea was recalled that when the Council 
receives Commission proposals and before it examines the substance, it should first 
decide whether the proposal correctly applies subsidiarity, but, the majority of 
members consider thatthe Council's decision-taking mechanism should not differ from 
that applied to the substance of the proposal. 
One member has suggested introducing into the Treaty a prov1s1on limiting any 
regulatory excesses and providing for more systematic use of clauses which expressly 
limit Community powers, as is at present the case with education, health and cultural 
affairs. 
71 . A very large majority within the Group is opposed to the request made by the 
Committee of the Regions in its report that it be authorized to bring proceedings 
before the Court of Justice for incorrect application of the principle of subsidiarity. 
They believe that it is not a task for the Committee of Regions to interpret the 
application of the principle of subsidiarity to the powers shared between the Union and 
the States. 
72. Various members have put forward the need to strengthen the principle of sufficient 
means in the Treaty as a way of moderating the exercise of the Community's powers. 
This principle does not pursue Community financing for every Community decision 
which creates costs for one of its Members but should imply "ex-ante" control of 
proposals so as to prevent the Union from deciding intolerable financial obligations 
against the will of those States which would be obliged to fund them from their 
national budgets. The principle of sufficient means looks for consistency between the 
ambitions of the Union's proposal and the constraints on the Member State provider 
of funds. 
73. Some members have stressed that correct application of subsidiarity and appropriate 
recognition of the principle of sufficient means could facilitate the transition from 
unanimity to qualified majority in areas such as education, environment or social 
policy. 
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Ill. AN EFFICIENT AND DEMOCRATIC UNION 
74. The objective of the 1996 reform, as defined in the terms of reference and given the 
challenge of enlargement, is to ensure that the Union functions efficiently and with 
legitimacy; in short, the purpose is to improve the quality of the way the Union works. 
To this end it will be necessary to clarify its objectives and refine the instruments that 
serve those objectives, bearing in mind that in future the intention is not that the 
Union should necessarily have more powers but that it should perform its tasks better. 
75. The instruments of the Union, that is to say its institutions, rules, resources and 
policies, are not ends in themselves but are there to serve the objectives and tasks of 
the Union. The aim of the reform must be to ensure that the adjustments decided at 
the Conference will enable the instruments of the Union to operate according to the 
criteria of efficiency, democracy, solidarity, transparency and subsidiarity. 
76. The richness of the Union's natural diversity, transparency and greater participation 
by national parliaments, and the legal security of a Community on the rule of law 
require strict observance of equal treatment of the Union's official languages on the 
part of the institutions. This behaviour obligation should be reinforced without 
amendment of the treaties. 
77. The 1996 reform must adjust the instruments of the Union so as to guarantee the 
improvement in their operation in the Union as it is now and in the Union that emerges 
from next enlargement. The reform is already necessary now, but the prospect of 
enlargement makes it imperative. The results of the Conference will have to be judged 
in this light. 
A. THE INSTITUTIONS 
General considerations 
78. The Group considers it necessary that the institutional reform should consolidate the 
single institutional framework throughout the Union Treaty, whatever its structure may 
be. lt is also the common view of the Group that the Union does not need to create 
new Institutions. 
79. The Group also considers that the reform of the institutions must observe the overall 
institutional balance, in accordance with the specific character of the European Union. 
This is consistent with the adaptation of the institutions to new circumstances and 
needs - especially to the increase in the number of Member States - after 
enlargement, with their strengthening and with a better definition of their respective 
functions. 
80. The prospect of the forthcoming enlargement makes it a matter of urgency that 
institutions designed for the six founding States of the Community be adapted, so that 
they can emerge from the Conference with renewed legitimacy: the more efficient and 
transparent the institutions of the Union are, the more support they receive from our 
citizens, the greater the benefits of all kinds that will flow from the Union to Europe 
and its citizens. An inappropriate or inadequate reform, on the other hand, would 
imperil the very nature of European integration. For this reason the negotiations for 
the accession of the applicant countries should not commence until the Conference 
has been concluded, as the European Council has pointed out. 
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The Eurooean Parliament 
81 . Composition: lt seems appropriate to fix a maximum number of seats. A majority 
accept a maximum of 700 in an enlarged Union, as the European Parliament itself 
proposes in its report. lt has also been suggested by some members that there should 
be at least enough members to ensure that major political forces of each Member 
State have the possibility to be represented. 
82. Uniform electoral procedure: lt has been recalled by the Group that Article 138(3) 
provides for the establishment of such a procedure in all Member States. Some 
members propose that this legal basis should be changed to help achieve this objective 
and that a final date be established for its application. Others do not consider such 
amendments necessary. 
Legislation: 
83. The EP's legislative initiative: The Group considers that the right of request established 
in Article 138b is broadly sufficient. Some members nevertheless point out that this 
Article should require the Commission to reply to the European Parliament's request. 
84. Legislative procedures: The Group is in favour of reducing the variety of procedures 
currently in force under the Treaty, and a large majority proposes its reduction to 
three: eo-decision, assent and consultation. Some members note that this should not 
imply a change of the present institutional balance. 
85. Some members propose that assent should be applied where the Council decides with 
unanimity, specially in Treaty changes (article N), own resources, article 235 and Third 
Countries' agreements. 
86. The Group feels it is appropriate to improve and simplify the codecision procedure 
without changing its nature. A large majority is in favour of extending it. Most would 
extend it to all legislation adopted by the Council by qualified majority. Another view 
focus extension to the matters currently dealt with by the cooperation procedure, 
whereas others suggest a case by case approach. 
One member, in principle, opposes any extension. 
87. Budgetary function: (see below under Resources) 
88. Political control: As regards the role of the EP in the appointment of the Commission. 
several members see that the current approval procedure of Article 158, applied for 
the first time to the present Commission, represents a satisfactory balance that should 
not be changed. Others would prefer the EP to elect the President of the Commission 
from a list proposed by the European Council. (As regards political control of the 
Commission, see below Commission). 
89. Executive control: A distinction should be made here between executive powers 
exercised by the Commission and those exercised by the Member States in 
implementation of Community law. Most members consider it appropriate to increase 
the EP's and the Ombudsman's powers in combating fraud and, in general, in 
monitoring the executive powers of the institutions. 
90. Role of the EP under Titles V and VI: (see under "Freedom and Internal Security" and 
"Common Foreign Policy"). 
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National oarliaments 
91. The Group considers that the national parliaments' principal role in relation to EU 
decision-making lies in the monitoring and control that each parliament exercises over 
its government's action in the Council. The procedures for exercising these powers 
are not a matter for the Union but are for each State to organize. 
92. The Group also recommends that the role of national parliaments be fully 
respected. Therefore, national parliaments should be provided with all the necessary 
information of the Union and its institutions. The Group feels that the Community 
and the Union must not act "by surprise". Rather, an improved process of prior 
consultation and transparency is required, the central pivot of which must be respect 
for the role played by each national parliament in shaping the will of each Member 
State in regard to Union matters. In consequence, the institutions, specially the 
Commission and the Council, should conduct their work so as to facilitate the task of 
national parliaments. This could be reinforced by amending the Treaty and/or adopting 
an appropriate code of conduct, so that each national parliament receives clear and 
complete documentation in its official language adequately in advance (four weeks has 
been mentioned) on every substantial Commission legislative proposal enabling each 
parliament to examine and discuss it before it is discussed and decided on by the 
Council. 
93. As for relations between the European Parliament and the national parliaments, the 
points contained in Declaration No 13 of the Treaty are especially apt. Some members 
referred to the possibility of giving Treaty force to some elements of Declaration 
No. 13. 
The experience of the last few years favours a formula which has been operating 
adequately, namely CO SAC, a conference composed of representatives of the 
European Affairs Committees of the national parliaments together with a delegation 
from the European Parliament. 
The Group nevertheless has doubts about the wisdom of making this conference more 
institutionalized as its success is perhaps due to its informal nature. At all events, it 
is a body for the exchange of information and should not take decisions or replace the 
expression of the will of the people in each of the parliaments for which this 
conference is a coordinating body. Another formula is that of the growing number of 
contacts between specialist committees of national parliaments and of the European 
Parliament, especially for matters such as Foreign Affairs or Justice and Home Affairs. 
In this context, the idea of the creation of a High Consultative Council made up of two 
representatives of each of the national parliaments has been put forward by one 
member. Such a body could, be consulted on Union matters outside Community 
competence. lt could also advice the Commission on the proper application of the 
subsidiarity principle when preparing a proposal. 
The Group shares the view that closer association of national parliaments should not 
result in the creation of a new institution or a permanent organ with its own staff and 
premises. 
The majority in the Group does not recommend as a general rule the convening of 
Conferences of the Parliaments as referred to in Declaration No 14 on the Treaty, in 
the light of the experience of using this arrangement, which is not very practical. 
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94. Among the practical improvements that might facilitate the role of the national 
parliaments, some members feel it would be worthwhile for Commissioners to appear 
before national parliaments whenever circumstances warrant this. An idea was 
advanced by some representatives that the members of the Court of Auditors could 
also appear before national parliaments. 
95. The creation of a second chamber comprising members of national parliaments has 
been rejected by the Group. 
The Eurooean Council and the Council 
96. The Group considers that the Conference must clarify and improve the role of the 
Council as an institution with legislative and executive functions, without detracting 
from other institutions and without prejudice to the institutional balance. The increase 
in the number of States affects the operation of this institution very directly. 
The European Council 
97. The Group considers that the European Council's central role is essential to the Union, 
as the ultimate political impulse and highest expression of the Union's political will and 
of its strategic policy formulation. The European Council assumed greater importance 
with the entry into force of the Maastricht Treaty when the Union acquired external 
policy and internal security responsibilities. The European Council is also the highest 
decision-making authority in the development of Economic and Monetary Union. The 
Group considers the leadership role of the European Council will be even more 
important in future in view of Europe's agenda. 
The Council 
98. Powers: The Group is in favour of maintaining its present functions and strengthening 
its capacity for action both by means of Treaty reforms and by practical improvements 
in the operation. 
Decision-making mechanisms 
* Unanimity and qualified-majority voting: 
99. There is broad agreement in the Group that unanimity should remain the rule for 
decisions on primary law: Article N and Article 0, as well as for establishing the 
system of the Union's own resources and their amount. All such decisions need to 
be ratified by national parliaments. 
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However, a few members have expressed concern about retaining unanimity on 
primary legislation in a Community enlarged to 30 members since such a 
procedure would render decision-making extremely difficult, and could in the 
future leave the Union in a state of paralysis. To resolve that problem, they point 
to the possibility of having some provisions of the Treaty either stipulate unanimity 
for a while, giving way thereafter to a more flexible decision-making mechanism, 
or stipulate that such a subsequent change would not take place automatically but 
could be adopted under a simplified procedure. The latter possibility is already 
envisaged in ECSC Treaty and for EMU. 
1 00. In the case of Community legislation, a large majority in the Group is prepared to 
consider making qualified-majority voting the general rule, on grounds of 
efficiency, since it will facilitate decision-making and, according to some reduce 
discrepancies between the state of development attained by the internal market 
(qualified majority) and the policies in the social, fiscal and environmental spheres 
(in which unanimity is often the rule). 
Some members consider exceptions warranted to safeguard sensitive interest: and 
one member sees no case for extending qualified-majority voting on the grounds 
that it would not mean more effective decision-making in comparison with 
unanimity. 
lt has been stressed by some members that the extension of qualified-majority 
voting would increase the efficiency of the Union only if its decisions are 
supported by a significant majority of the Union's citizens. In this context, those 
members point out to the need of adequately taking into account of population in 
the decision-making by the re-weighting of votes within the Council, and/or the 
adoption of a double significant majority of votes and citizens. Strengthening the 
principles of subsidiarity and adequacy of means have also been mentioned to help 
extension of qualified-majority voting in this context. 
1 01 . Novel arrangements steering a middle course between unanimity and 
qualified-majority voting have been mentioned in the Group for Council decisions 
on Title V and VI matters (a super-qualified majority, positive abstention, a 
qualified majority with a minority dispensation or consensus minus one). None of 
these have been explored in depth. However, it would be possible to have 
different decision-making procedures for the Council in such matters if they are 
established in the Treaty, irrespectively of its structure. 
* Threshold for a qualified majority and weighting of votes: 
1 02. The European Council has decided that the 1996 Conference is to consider the 
question of the present qualified-majority and vote-weighting system, which 
currently operates in accordance with the current Treaty provisions as interpreted 
by the loannina compromise with regard to their practical implementation. The 
Group has been instructed to look into the matter. 
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103. There is a majority in the Group in favour of the 1996 Conference establishing a 
qualified-majority voting system through which the Union will strengthen its 
effectiveness and legitimacy. The Union must be able to take decisions but some 
members insist that it is not simply a matter of assisting the ability to decide. Its 
effectiveness will depend on such decisions having the backing of as many 
European citizens as possible. For this to be the case, the revision should keep the 
qualified-majority threshold at an effective level and such decisions should not 
leave a significant proportion of the people of Europe in a minority. However, 
there is no specific option enjoying broad support in the Group when it comes to 
putting this into practice. 
1 04. Several members point to a gradual deterioration in popular representation in the 
weighting of qualified-majority voting as a result of the under-representation of the 
people of the more populous States and the growing number of less populous 
States in the Union. These members underline that this gradual deterioration feeds 
into decisions on policies which directly affect citizens in an integrated area. 
According to these members this problem seems even more serious in the view 
of next enlargement. 
In the view of some, the answer is a new weighting of votes that takes greater 
account of population. On the other hand, a system of double majority of votes 
and population has been suggested. In this view, for some, decisions should be 
taken by a simple majority of States and population behind them. This implies the 
suppression of different weight in votes for Member States, and of the qualified 
majority voting system. For others, counting on population should not substitute 
but reinforce the qualified majority voting. For these members, besides reweighting 
of votes, the Conference should establish the significant proportion of Union's 
population that should allow decisions by qualified majority system. 
105. In any event, several members have voiced objections to the arguments in support 
of greater account being taken of the population criteria in qualified majority 
voting. Some have pointed out that the entire integration process rests on the 
fundamental principle of sovereign equality of States, with the present voting 
system already representing a concession under that principle. Others have taken 
the view that the present voting takes due account of population, arguing that in 
any case the institution which represents the people is the European Parliament. 
These members also emphasize that the smaller and medium sized Member States 
do not act as a block and that there is little if any prospect of Governments 
representing a majority of the Union's citizens being outvoted. 
One member has stated that the present balance is satisfactory and should be 
maintained; but, since the enlargement will bring into the Union mainly small 
countries, keeping the present formula would weaken the position of the larger 
Member States, and, consequently, the number of votes granted to the last ones 
should accordingly be increased but without retaining a precise proportion between 
votes and population. 
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Organization and working methods 
1 06. Aside from the growing imbalance pointed to by some in the voting mechanism, 
which they believe impairs the legitimacy of Council decisions, a broad majority 
in the Group sees a gradual deterioration both in the organization of the Council 
and in its working methods, devised for a smaller number of Member States. Both 
can be improved without revising the Treaties, although certain aspects of them, 
such as the role of the Council Presidency, are dealt with by the Treaty and this 
is therefore discussed as a separate issue. 
Publicity 
The Group points to the need for the General Affairs Council to regain its role of 
general coordination of the Union's affairs, ensuring overall consistency in Council 
actions in all areas of the Treaty. With that end in view, some members of the 
Group have suggested practical improvements, such as the possibility of the 
General Affairs Council meetings being held at two levels: a preparatory level, 
composed of Ministers for European Affairs, and full-member level, which would 
concentrate on the most important issues. The Group also advocates greater 
consistency in the committees paving the way for Council meetings. In this 
context, several members were concerned to maintain the specific roles of these 
committees. A large majority recommends strengthening Coreper in its key role of 
coordinating and preparing for Council meetings in order to ensure their overall 
consistency. 
In addition, the Group recommends that consideration be given to fresh 
approaches to preparatory work for the Council with the next enlargement in 
prospect. The possibility should here be looked into of replacing some stages of 
discussions in working parties by a written procedure. These ideas should be 
given further consideration. 
1 07. The Group notes that substantial progress has been made in making the workings 
of the Council more open. Following the 1993 Council rules of procedure, many 
Council votes are now published, and there has been a number of public Council 
debates. Most recently, the Council decision in October establishes much greater 
access to Council minutes (when the Council is acting as legislator) and minutes 
statements. 
However, the Group agrees that further progress could be made. Several 
members maintain that the Council should meet in public whenever it is acting as 
a legislative authority. Several members in the Group favour extending the Council 
rules of procedure, to provide that Council votes on legislation be made public in 
all cases and not, as at present, unless the Council decides against; and that the 
initial debates on significant legislative questions should all in principle be made 
public. 
Others, while sharing a will for transparency, point out that it is not easy in 
practice to separate the Council's discussions acting as legislator from its 
deliberations as a political institution with executive powers. They emphasize that 
what is involved in practice is a continual, intensive task of negotiation, which 
should not be performed in public if it is to remain genuine. 
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Presidency 
108. The Group highlights the important role of the Presidency and its fundamental 
responsibilities for the conduct of the Council's affairs. The majority in the Group 
takes a positive view of the six-monthly rotating Presidency system under the 
Treaty (Article 146 EC, Article 27 ECSC and Article 116 EURATOM) since it 
fosters a sense of belonging and the urge to excel on the part of those holding 
office. 
However, the present system applied to a 30-member Union would mean that 
each member serves as President only every 1 5 years. For some there could also 
be problems concerned with the accession of very small States. The Group has 
therefore considered different possible arrangements. One proposal has been the 
idea of a team-Presidency consisting for instance of four member States acting for 
a period of at least 12 months. Within the limits of the present Treaty there are 
practical improvements which must be given more careful study. 
The Commission 
Powers 
109. Exclusive right of legislative initiative: The Group considers that maintenance of 
the Commission's monopoly of initiative is a fundamental aspect of the 
institutional balance of the Community. lt will be exercised without prejudice to 
the right of request under the Treaty and the possible inclusion of an obligation to 
reply. 
lt is broadly accepted that legislative proposals should lapse at the end of the term 
of the European Parliament if they are not expressely confirmed by the 
Commission. 
Moreover, some members have suggested that the Commission set a time limit to 
some proposals on a case-by-case basis ("sunset clause"): those Commission 
proposals should include the period of validity of the provisions proposed, with a 
date laid down for expire or review, and/or should lapse after a fixed space of 
time, if not adopted by then. 
110. Guardian of the Treaties: The Group is in favour of retaining this role. 
111 . Executive powers: The large majority of the Group is in favour of retaining the 
present system of responsibilities, in which the Commission shares executive 
powers with the Council. One member has put forward the idea of transferring 
executive powers of the Commission to special agencies. The broad majority of 
the Group considers that it is for the Commission as a college to exert its powers 
in full responsibility. 
The Group also agrees that more needs to be done to ensure full and even 
implementation of EC law and obligations. 
112. Powers of the Commission under Titles V and VI: These are dealt with in 
commenting on those Titles of the Treaty. 
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Composition of the college 
113. The Group considers that a suitably constituted college of Commissioners is a 
fundamental aspect of the credibility and legitimacy of the Commission as an 
institution able to lend its proposals overall consistency and able to identify the 
different sensibilities and interests affected by each of its proposals. 
114. In considering the various options for the composition of the college, the Group 
has attempted to identify proposals avoiding a confrontation between States with 
larger and smaller populations, while endeavouring to achieve a result providing 
greater democracy, greater effectiveness and a higher profile for this important 
institution. In the light of these considerations, it identifies basically two possible 
approaches set out hereunder. 
115. One option would be to retain the present system under the Treaty. This 
arrangement has the advantage of ensuring at least a Commissioner per Member 
State, thus fostering their citizens' sense of belonging. Some members of the 
Group have pointed out, that they would have difficulty in supporting any revision 
as a result of which they did not have a Commissioner of their own nationality. 
The drawback of this arrangement, in the view of some, is that an institution 
originally designed for a nine-member college now has 20 members and in a 
30-member Union would have at least 36. The problem posed by such a large 
number of Commissioners is the difficulty of warranting portfolios of any real 
substance in a Commission which is not going to increase proportionally the 
number of its powers. This will give less importance to the members of a college 
which will be not only greater in number but also much more heterogeneous and 
thus likely to be less consistent in its decisions. 
Its advocates, on the other hand, believe that these problems are surmountable. 
An enlarged College can strengthen its internal consistency and collegiality by 
adapting its working methods and, if necessary, its decision-making procedures. 
Its efficiency could be also increased by allowing greater authority for its 
President, and through an increased parliamentary monitoring. In support of their 
arguments, they point out that some Member States' Governments are composed 
of over 36 Ministers. Lastly, they maintain that the Community should not opt out 
of its complexity in as much as it ensures the safeguarding of its diversity. The 
presence of Commissioners of all nationalities is not the simplest course but it 
allows such diversity to be preserved. 
116. An alternative option is to ascertain the appropriate number of Commissioners to 
perform the Commission's duties consistently and effectively. They would then 
be fewer than the number of Member States. This option has the advantage of 
visibility and consistency, it restores to the Commission its collegiate nature and 
independence, it avoids proliferation, bringing savings in human and financial 
resources, and it would give the Commission a higher profile, as the Institution 
that safeguards the general interests of the Community. 
Its drawbacks have been pointed out in describing the advantages of the previous 
option: it fails to ensure the presence of Commissioners of all of the Union's 
nationalities at all times. 
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In its supporters' view, this option should not involve any discrimination since the 
Commissioners should be chosen by the President of the Commission (who would 
be chosen by the Parliament, acting on a proposal from the European Council, and 
subsequently invested, together with the entire college, by the Parliament) on their 
merits, from a list of three candidates put forward by each of the Member States. 
This system would make for a higher-quality membership of the college. 




Some members have put forward as a middle way the option of a 
Commission composed of just one national Commissioner from each of the 
Member States, thus removing the second Commissioner which the five most 
populous States currently have. This would result in a maximum of 
30 Commissioners instead of 36 for a Union of 30 Member States. Other 
members of the Group regard this option as unbalanced and tantamount to 
renationalizing the college, converting it into a kind of Council deciding by a 
simple majority, with a negative effect on popular representation in 
decision-making. This option would only be considered by those members 
if it were accompanied by amendment of the voting system in the college to 
introduce qualified-majority voting for its decisions. For the majority of 
members such a system of voting would strip the Commission of its 
originality and independence. For some members, the option of a 
Commissioner per Member State will not make it possible to maintain the 
present voting system in the Commission. 
Others propose a reduced college in which each Commissioner would 
represent a minimum number of inhabitants, which would result in the 
permanent presence of nationals of the more populous States and rotation for 
nationals of the rest of the Union. Seen in those terms, this arrangement is 
rejected by various members. 
118. Another idea that has been put forward is the possibility of the college in future 
being composed of two kinds of Commissioners, seniors members and voting or 
non-voting juniors commissioners. This proposal is, in principle, favourably 
considered by some members as a possible way of enriching or approaching the 
afore mentioned options, and should be given further examination in the 
Conference. 
Accountability of the Commission 
119. A majority in the Group favours making the Commission more accountable to the 
European Parliament. Some members propose the possibility of individual motions 
of censure of Commission members by the Parliament, but others object to this 
on the grounds that such a possibility would undermine the collegiate nature of the 
Commission. Some members advocate establishing procedures to improve the 
accountability of the Commission to the Council. 
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Other institutions and bodies 
Court of Justice 
120. The Group agrees on the need to strengthen the Court's role, highlighting the part 
played by the Court in watching over a Community based on the rule of law, in 
ensuring legal uniformity in the interpretation of Community law and in 
guaranteeing the protection of individual citizens' rights. 
A majority of representatives are in favour of stepping up its role in the fields of 
justice and home affairs on grounds of legal certainty, in order to ensure the 
protection of individual rights which might be affected in those fields. A few have 
suggested the possibility of enabling the Court to enforce more swiftly the 
penalties it may impose. 
One member argues, however, that ECJ judgments can lead to consequences that 
are considered disproportionate in their effect. This member suggests that the 
Conference should examine possible limits to member States economic liability 
when a member State has genuinely attempted to comply with Community law 
and the application of national time limits in such cases. This representative also 
suggests that the Conference should consider limits on the retrospective effect of 
judgements and the establishment of a right of appeal. 
A proposal that the Court should speed up its procedures and improve its 
translation facilities was favourably received by the Group. 
The Group has not been able to deepen the valuable ideas put forward by the 
Court in its report. A broad majority in the Group is prepared to recommend 
consideration of the amendment of Article 188 proposed by the Court in order to 
be able to adopt rules of procedure, which other institutions and bodies are already 
able to do. 
121. As regards the Court's composition and number of members, a maJonty of 
representatives think the term of office of Judges should be extended to nine 
years, with no possibility of reappointment. With a view to future enlargement of 
the Union some take the view that the number of Judges, should be fewer than 
the Member States in order to ensure efficiency and consistency. Others take the 
line that all States should have a Judge at the Court so that all legal systems of 
Member States are represented. A middle course put forward is that, for the 
purposes of national participation, not only Judges should count but 
Advocates-General as well. 
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Court of Auditors 
122. The Group note the key role of the Court in taking effective action against fraud 
and financial mismanagement of the Community budget. 
Proposals have been put forward to make explicit the duty of States' internal 
official bodies and of national audit boards to cooperate with the Court of Auditors 
and also to make clear its ability to audit the Union's accounts for foreign policy 
and for justice and home affairs. The possibility has been expressed of the 
European Parliament being more directly involved in the appointment of the 
Court's members. Some members have also suggested that it should be granted 
a right of access to the Court of Justice for the protection of its prerogatives. 
The Group makes the point that more effective action against fraud is also and 
primarily a matter for the Member States. 
Committee of the Regions 
123. The majority of the Group underlines the importance of the role played by this 
body representing the regions and local authorities and fostering throughout the 
whole territory of the European Union a further sense of belonging. lt is also, 
however, argued by some that, as an innovative acquisition of the Union, it 
needs to be given time to fullfledge its effectiveness before consideration is given 
to developing it further. 
The majority view is that it could be provided with administrative machinery of its 
own, that its consultative functions could be better used and possibly extended 
and that the European Parliament should have the right to consult it. Some 
members argue for it to be given active legal capacity before the Court of Justice 
in order to safeguard its prerogatives and one representative would like such 
capacity to be extended to the bringing of proceedings for infringement of the 
principle of subsidiarity. 
Economic and Social Committee 
124. A broad majority points to its role in social dialogue and appreciates its 
contribution as a consultative committee in economic and social matters, the 
abilities of which should be better exploited at the consultative stage in 
preparation for legislative action. One member, however, questions the future role 
of the Committee given the increased use of white and green papers and other 
possibilities for direct consultation. 
B. ACTS, RESOURCES, AND POLICIES 
Article 235 
125. The Group is not in favour of incorporating a catalogue of the Union's powers in the 
Treaty and would prefer to maintain the present system, which establishes the legal 
basis for the Union's actions and policies in each individual case. lt is therefore in 
favour of maintaining Article 235 as the instrument for dealing with the changing 
nature of interpretation of the Union's objectives. Some members have suggested 
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incorporating the EP assent requirement in Article 235. 
Hierarchy of acts 
126. The Group has analyzed this question in accordance with the brief contained in 
Declaration No 1 6 annexed to the Treaty and identified two positions: 
* 
* 
Those who favour establishing a hierarchy of Community acts based on the level of 
their origin source (constitutional acts, legislative acts and implementing acts) point 
out that this classification would render simpler and more transparent the 
application of subsidiarity. The functions of each institution would be clarified by 
such a system of Community law hierarchy: Treaties would be adopted by 
unanimous decision of the Council followed by ratification by national parliaments, 
laws would be adopted on a Commission proposal by eo-decision of the Council and 
the Parliament and the Commission or the Member States would be responsible for 
implementing provisions, the former under Council and Parliament supervision. 
Those who are opposed to this system do not deny its clarity, but refute its logic, 
which is based on the idea of separation of powers within a State, since this 
approach would transform the Council into a second legislative chamber and the 
Commission into the European executive. Their view is that the Union has its own 
particular nature which is suited to a characteristic classification of acts: Regulations, 
Directives, Decisions and Recommendations. They feel, however, that within this 
characteristic system it is possible to clarify the functions of each of the institutions 
while maintaining the balance between them. In this context, they recommend a 
return to the original spirit of the Treaty through greater attention to the quality of 
each act and a use of the Directive which is more in line with its genuine purpose. 
lt was also pointed out that the introduction of the eo-decision procedure has meant 
that the debate on the hierarchy of acts has lost its previous importance. 
Among those in favour of a hierarchy of acts, some stress that directives should be 
retained as best suited means to abide with the principle of subsidiarity. 
Powers of execution (committee procedure) 
127. On this subject, which the interinstitutional "modus vivendi" of 20 December 1994 





Those in favour of a hierarchy of acts resolve this issue by assigning full power to 
the Commission, subject to control by the Council and the European Parliament. 
Those opposed to granting executive power to the Commission because they believe 
it would disturb the balance between the institutions are willing to consider simplified 
procedures which would not undermine the Council's executive functions. 
There is a compromise proposal for a single procedure under which it would be up 
to the Commission, in consultation with national experts, to decide on implementing 
measures under the supervision of the Council and the EP, which could cancel the 
measures and request the application of normal legislative procedures. At least 
one member pointed out that opposition by a minority of States should be sufficient 
to reject any implementing measure. 
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·. 
128. In any case, a large majority in the Group is in favour of simplifying the present 
committee procedure, which is already complicated and confused and will not 
survive beyond the next enlargement. The need to improve the quality of the rules 
adopted under these procedures was also emphasized. 
In any event, revision of the 1987 Decision on committee procedure does not require 
reform of the Treaty and therefore consideration must be given to the improvements 
which can be introduced before the Conference. In this context, one member has 
suggested the idea of introducing a standard set of internal rules of procedure to 
apply to all committees. 
Monitoring the implementation of acts 
129. The Group considers that the Commission should make full use of the powers 
conferred upon it by Article 171 regarding penalties for failure to comply with 
Community law. Some propose that Article 171 be amended to enable the Court of 
Justice, at the Commission's request, to impose penalties on Member States in 
default, without the need for the second court case currently required. 
130. Some members suggest that the EP's powers in this area should be strengthened by 
means of Investigative Committees empowered to convene and request explanations 
from Community, and even national, authorities. lt was also pointed out that the 
Commission should make periodical reports on procedures of infractions. 
131. On the other hand, a majority suggests making it obligatory for the Commission to 
produce annual reports on the effectiveness of policies implemented. 
132. Some members also propose allowing private individuals more effective means of 
action to appeal against failure to comply with Community legislation. 
Combating fraud 
133. The Group wants the Community institutions to be more effective in combating 
fraud, improving financial control of the Community budget, ensuring value for 
money and full compliance with Community law. 
A large majority believes that the European Parliament and the Court of Auditors 
should make full use of their responsibilities in combating fraud which, according to 
some, could be reinforced. All institutions and bodies must be subject to proper 
control. 
lt also must be recalled that often fraud cases appear within the Member States at 
regional and local level. As pointed out in the chapter on Justice and Internal 
Security several members of the Group suggested a harmonized rule in the national 
penal codes punishing fraud against the Community budget. 
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Resources 
1 34. The 1 993 lnterinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline and improvement of 
the budgetary procedure provides for examination of these questions on the occasion 
of 1996 Conference. 
Own resources 
1 35. Most members of the Group do not want the IGC 96 to deal with these questions. 
They point out that there is already another session planned for 1 999, the year in 
which the present Financial Agreement expires. All aspects of the system of 
resources should be examined at that time. Any other course of action would 
unnecessarily complicate the agenda for the 1996 Conference and run the risk of 
delaying the European agenda scheduled to follow the Conference. The Community 
has always adopted a stage-by-stage approach and accumulating tasks for the 
IGC 96 would lead to a general debate about the future of Europe which would prove 
unmanageable. 
136. Some members note, however, that the system of own resources is one matter and 
the amounts involved another, and that the Conference is the proper time to lay 
down in the Treaty, if so desired, the legal bases for a new system of the 
Community's own resources and the participation of the Community Institutions in 
these decisions. 
As for possible revision of the system of contributions to the Community budget, 
some members advocate introducing a new revenue system which takes account of 
the relative prosperity of the various Member States, with several of them wanting 
the Conference to reduce the lack of consistency between the EP's powers with 
regard to expenditure and its present very limited role in revenue arrangements. 
Others defend the present system as reasonable. 
1 37. At least one member is in favour of incorporating multi annual financial programming 
in the Treaty. A clear majority would prefer to keep it outside the main framework 
in the more flexible domain of interinstitutional agreements. 
Budgetary procedure 
138. In addition to the fairly general wish to simplify the procedure (abolition of one of the 
readings), the proposal made by some members to reduce the lack of consistency 
between the EP's budget powers with regard to expenditure and those with regard 
to revenue has already been mentioned. In the case of expenditure, some members 
propose simplifying the procedure by removing the distinction between compulsory 
and non-compulsory expenditure. Most members, are, however, against removing 
the CE/NCE distinction. Some suggest an intermediate approach for improving the 
balance of budget powers between the Council and the Parliament which would 
involve giving the latter some latitude to intervene in CE, perhaps in the form of a 
percentage. 
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Monitoring expenditure 
139. As we saw earlier, a broad majority is in favour of strengthening the role of the 
Court of Auditors in the fight against fraud and establishing closer cooperation with 
national audit bodies. According to some members Ecofin and Budget Council 
should have more control over spending activities when dealt with in the Council. 
Policies 
140. The general feeling within the Group is that the Community should try to do not 
more but better. 
141 . In accordance with Declaration No 1 annexed to the TEU, the Group has analyzed 
the possibility of including the spheres of energy, tourism and civil protection in 
common policies and, although several members consider that specific Community 
action in one or another of those subjects is of great interest, a majority has reached 
the conclusion that it would probably be more appropriate in these spheres simply 
to envisage greater cooperation between the Member States. One member holds the 
opinion that article 3t should be deleted. 
142. Several members think it necessary to incorporate a provision in the Treaty dealing 
specifically with support for the outermost and island regions of Member States of 
the Union. Some members point out that the Treaty should highlight the importance 
of local development. 
143. Some members have suggested extending Article 113 to cover commercial policy 
as a whole and therefore including services and intellectual property. Other members 
recall the importance that they attach to the Opinion 1/94 of the European Court of 
Justice. 
144. Finally, some members have noted that maintaining Article 235 will make it possible, 
when appropriate, to embark on new spheres of Community action while complying 
with the limits of the Treaty. 
145. Some members consider that the requirement of a high level of consumer protection 
should be taken into account also in other Community policies and that Article 129a 
should be revised accordingly. 
SN 520/95 (REFLEX 21) EN 
- 38-
IV. EXTERNAL UNION ACTION 
146. The profound changes which occurred in Europe at the end of the cold war have 
radically altered the scenario of international relations hitherto operating in the 
world. The threat posed by rival blocks facing each other has receded and has given 
way to new roles of the main actors on the international political scene and to an 
overall more secure, but also more unstable situation. The European Union must 
assume increased responsibilities in this new context and thus has to face new 
challenges confronting it. This requires the Union to give itself the means 
appropriate to more effective and coordinated external action. 
14 7. The next enlargement is clearly a response to the new responsibilities but it in turn 
poses a challenge to the Union. Enlargement will undoubtedly make for political 
stability and security for the people of Europe but it will bring a qualitative change 
to the internal and external dimension of the Union. Preparations must be 
accomplished inter alia by clarifying the objectives and strengthening the instruments 
of the Union's external action. 
148. In evaluating the experience from a complete new Title (V) on Common Foreign and 
Security Policy (CFSP), introduced by Maastricht into the TEU, the Group has drawn 
the following two conclusions. First, despite the short period of time which has 
elapsed, some positive results, such as the Stability Pact, have been achieved. 
Second, shortcomings in the operation of Title V and problems of a lack of overall 
consistency in coping with the new challenges have been detected. 
The Group does not share, however, a common view of the causes of these 
shortcomings and problems. For some this is partly due to the lack of running-in 
time of a novel part of the Treaty yet to be developed or to the creation of 
excessively high and as yet unfulfillable expectations; for others there is a lack of 
political will and inertia of attitudes; for the majority there is also a structural problem 
of a mismatch between fairly ambitious, albeit somewhat vague, objectives and 
inadequate instruments for achieving them. Still others blame the shortcomings 
mainly on the current functioning of the Institutions and on the inadequate structural 
cohesion of a Treaty organized into "pillars". 
Some members have pointed here to a readily discernible distinction between two 
kinds of Union external action: one working satisfactorily and the other with a long 
way to go. The first is the external dimension of Community policies and the second 
the CFSP. Many members see the real problem with the CFSP as lying in the 
disjunction between the external political and external economic dimensions of the 
Union. They have emphasized the lack of synergy and coordination between the 
first and second "pillars" and the paradox whereby matters of great moment with 
far-reaching economic implications, both for the Member States and for their 
citizens, are decided successfully by a qualified majority under the first "pillar", 
whereas others of less substance and consequence require a consensus under the 
CFSP. According to some, recent practice shows that the current functioning of the 
"pillars" does n~t make for increased consistency between actions undertaken under 
them but that, on the contrary, there is a risk of spill-over from the second "pillar" 
to the first, which reduces the efficiency of the Union and which could weaken the 
"acquis". Some are equally concerned by the opposite effect. 
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A. GLOBALITY AND CONSISTENCY 
149. In view of the interdependent and global nature of today's world, many members call 
for a global approach to overcome inconsistencies between the external dimension 
of the Community and foreign policy proper. According to them, the weakness of 
Title V lies in the current separation between political, economic and military 
aspects. They highlight a need for greater consistency in all aspects of external 
action so that the Union's political weight matches its economic strength. 
In order that the Union can ensure the member States the influence which it must 
exercise, bearing in mind their collective importance in economic and political fields, 
it is necessary both to make the most of the potential synergies between the 
different strands of external relations, and to ensure the effectiveness of each of the 
elements and of the Union as a whole. 
150. To correct these problems and to facilitate the synergies required, the following 
ideas have been put forward: 
- A majority considers that the Treaty already sets adequate, though somewhat 
general, objectives and that the problem lies in the structural difficulties which 
prevent them from being achieved. This being so, some members seek a more 
specific statement of the Union's fundamental interests, as referred to in 
Article J.1 (2). Their definition in relation to geographical areas has been suggested 
by some. Other members see the need for definition of common interest not 
through a geographical approach, but through common priorities such as 
reinforced diplomatic solidarity between Member States, guaranteeing of external 
frontiers and the upholding and defence of human rights and democracy. 
- A majority of members points to the advantage of international legal personality 
for the Union so that it can conclude international agreements on the subject-
matter of Titles V and VI concerning the CFSP and the external dimension of 
justice and home affairs. For them, the fact that the Union does not legally exist 
is a source of confusion outside and diminishes its external role. Others consider 
that the creation of international legal personality for the Union could risk 
confusion with the legal prerogatives of Member States. 
- The smooth operation of the whole institutional system requires better definition 
of the various instruments. Here, some representatives state that the differences 
between common positions and joint actions should be clarified as this would help 
to strengthen the consistency of the Union's external action. 
- Lastly, in order to ensure optimum consistency in Union action, many members 
call for the introduction of a comprehensive set of rules. Some consider that a 
logical solution would be to dispense with the "pillar" structure, but retain specific 
proposal, decision-making and implementation procedures within the Community 
(following the EMU example). Others see a solution in greater cooperation and 
consistency between "pillars", and in structural coordination between the 
Presidency and the Commission. 
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151. In any event, it: has been pointed out that decisions with political impact are taken 
in both CFSP and Community matters and that the Council is always involved; and 
that, once a decision has been taken, the Commission is required to take account of 
it in carrying out its executive role, regardless of whether the decision was taken 
under the first or second "pillar". The purpose of the reform is to ensure that Union 
external action$ are clearly perceived as forming a harmonious whole. 
For some representatives that idea should be expressly enshrined in the TEU by 
spelling out in Articles J.2 and J.3 that common positions and joint actions are 
binding on the Commission. 
For other members, it should rather be emphasized that decisions under all "pillars" 
are taken withi~ a single institutional framework in which all institutions participate 
and where the European Council provides guidelines. The day-to-day coordination 
of external action in order to ensure consistency between the Community and CFSP 
frameworks is, pursuant to article C, a matter for the Commission and the Council. 
To reinforce this, Article J.S, paragraph 2 might name not only the Council, but also 
the Commission, as having responsibility for ensuring consistency of external action 
decided in bothi the Community and CFSP frameworks. The necessary coordination 
between the two institutions, to this effect, must be ensured. 
The need for greater consistency should also inform preparations for Council 
proceedings, clarifying the relationship between Core per and the Political Committee. 
In that sense some members consider that Coreper's coordinating and central role 
as the preparatory committee for the whole of the areas within the Council's 
competence should be reinforced in the Treaty. 
B. COMMON FOREIGN POLICY 
152. With a view to rectifying shortcomings in the operation of Title V, the Group 
I 
considered the various stages of the realization of the CFSP, i.e. formulation, 
decision-making and implementation. Unlike the Community decision-making 
process, in the CFSP area it is not easy to distinguish clearly between the various 
stages, so that it would not be realistic to use a rigid structure based on a 
successive distribution of tasks, since they intertwine. From a methodological 
viewpoint, it would nonetheless seem desirable to look at each one of them 
i separately. · 
The formulation stage: setting uo of an analysis unit 
153. Regarding the preparatory stage of common foreign policy, the majority of the Group 
agrees that an analysis, forecasting, early warning system and planning unit should 
be set up. Thu!s, the necessary follow-up to crisis situations could be ensured from 
the outset; possible response and decision options could be considered and prepared. 
Such a unit could, moreover, encourage a common vision and greater cooperation 
among the Member States. The latter and the Commission should in the unit share 
the information they possess so that correct analyses of the situations may be done. 
In principle, setting up such a body does not necessarily require reform of the 
Treaties. i 
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As regards the unit's composition and location, most representatives advocate 
locating it in the General Secretariat of the Council, with a strengthening of its 
structures. Those in favour of this option point to the merit of abiding by the 
present institutional framework by not creating any new bodies, and highlight the 
advantage of situating the unit at the Council on account of the central role played 
by the States within the CFSP. As stated above, a broad majority of members point 
at the same time to the need to involve the Commission in forecasting and analysis, 
by establishing a close link with the General Secretariat of the Council in order to 
avoid inconsistency between the political dimension and the external economic 
dimension of the Union. For a large majority, it is understood that the unit should 
include Commission staff as well as staff from the national foreign ministries. 
Regardless of the location chosen, certain members see a case for some form of link 
or coordination between the unit and the WEU. 
lt is widely considered that, far from developing into a new institution, the analysis 
and forecasting unit ought to be a preparatory body and therefore have no formal 
right of initiative, which could be a source of conflict or confusion of powers 
between Member States, the Council and the Commission. 
Decisions 
1 54. With regard to decision-making procedures, some state that the failure to use 
qualified majority voting is one of the reasons for the ineffectiveness of the CFSP, 
which is why more general use should be made of such a procedure in this sphere, 
particularly given the prospect of enlargement. Others take the view that consensus 
and the right of veto are essential in matters which lie so close to the heart of 
national sovereignty and that unanimity does not prevent important decisions from 
being taken. 
As intermediate options, the Group explored ad hoc arrangements such as unanimity 
with "positive or constructive abstention", "unanimity minus one", "super-qualified 
majority", qualified majority with dispensation of the minority, general platforms of 
decisions taken by unanimity to be followed in their specifics by qualified-majority 
voting, in order to overcome the risk of deadlock in a field in which the Union needs 
decision-making capability. lt is understood that constructive or positive abstention 
would involve political solidarity and, according to some, also financial solidarity with 
the decision taken. Those ideas should be examined further by the Conference. 
There is widespread agreement on the need to have more frequent recourse to the 
possibilities for majority voting laid down in the TEU. 
lt should be commonly agreed whether, and if so, how to provide for the possibility 
of flexible formulae which will not prevent those who feel it necessary to take for 
the Union a joint action from doing so. 
155. The efficiency imperative will succeed only if the legitimacy of decisions in this area 
is assured. Given that in some cases it might not be acceptable for a State to be put 
into a minority, many of those in favour of the adoption of decisions by qualified 
majority favour as a further arrangement the recognition that a fundamental or vital 
national interest may prevent a common position or action. According to some 
members, this approach should be tempered by the need for prior definition of the 
concept of vital interest and the circumstances in which it applies. 
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Implementation: management and administration 
156. Because of the specific nature of the CFSP, instead of implementation, (which is a 
matter for the Member States and/or the Council and - within areas falling within its 
jurisdiction -for the Commission), we should really use the terms management or 
administration, depending on whether we want to highlight internal or external 
aspects respectively. To achieve this, the Group identifies various possible 
approaches: either the CFSP might be personified in the guise of a "Mr or Ms CFSP", 
or through arrangements which keep the central role of the Presidency in the 
external representation and implementation of the CFSP; another possibility would 
be to reinforce the Commission's role and responsibilities in this area. 
Personification of CFSP 
157. In order to find an answer to the problem of stability and continuity in the Union's 
external representation, the Group examined the possibility of embodying the CFSP 
behind the figurehead of a "Mr or Ms CFSP". Three main options were identified: 
158. Some members consider that this function would devolve, at least in time, upon the 
Commission. The advantage would be that it would be better able to ensure 
consistency with external economic measures and to call directly on Commission 
resources and means to implement foreign policy. While situating such a person in 
the Commission, possibly with a special status given by the European Council the 
advocates of this option recognize that CFSP management would, in any case, 
require a method for the Institutions to work in common and an ad hoc system of 
voting within the Council in line with the arrangements outlined above. 
159. For the majority, this would be someone in the Council. They consider that this 
approach is more in keeping with the central role which States have within the 
framework of the Council in relation to the CFSP. Two variants, which are not 
respectively incompatible, have been identified: 
Some members advocate creating a new figure, a High Representative for the 
CFSP, appointed and dismissable by the European Council, and receiving 
instructions directly from it, and from the General Affairs Council. 
Within this variant the High Representative must be clearly subordinate not 
only to the European Council but also to the General Affairs Council and to the 
Presidency. 
Others advocate nomination by General Affairs Council and placing this 
function within the General Secretariat of the Council, with its structures 
strengthened and the duties of Secretary-General raised to high ranking level. 
Those in favour of this option emphasize that it would not require any change 
in the current framework and that it would avoid any danger of conflict with 
the Council Presidency to which it would in any event remain subordinate. 
Some propose that this "Mr CFSP" attends the Commission when it discusses 
matters relating to external action. 
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160. A synthesis option would be that the President of the Council together with the 
Commission, takes direct charge of CFSP affairs assisted by a Secretary-General of the 
Council who would head the analysis and planning unit and have increased functions. This 
option would be even more effective if the Secretary of the WEU and the 
Secretary-General of the Council were one and the same person. 
161. There is no consensus on the personification of CFSP. Many members stress that the 
formula decided upon must allow for a higher profile for the Union without introducing 
additional confusion over functions or creating a conflict between the powers of this new 
personality and those of the Council Presidency, nor fragmenting the unity of the existing 
institutional framework. Lastly, they do not want this "Mr or Ms CFSP" to contribute to 
increased inconsistency between the "pillars". 
162. Various representatives insist that, over and above the alternatives described, the central 
role of the Presidency must be maintained in the external representation and 
implementation of CFSP and should not be impaired through any external representation 
figure. Such is the current approach of the Treaty, although the Union's enlargement and 
growing external responsibilities make it advisable to consider ways of bolstering the 
Presidency by means of better utilization of the Troika or, as some representatives see it, 
by means of some innovative Presidency formula, either in the form of teams or by other 
arrangements ensuring participation, democratic legitimacy and continuity in the exercise 
of the Presidency. lt was also underlined that coordination between the Presidency and the 
Commission must in any case be strengthened and that this should also be done 
structurally. 
Other auestions 
163. As regards the financing of the CFSP, there is consensus in the Group on the need to 
establish specific procedures ensuring the availability of the funds necessary for rapid 
action when required. In any event, solidarity in general and, according to many members, 
financial solidarity in particular should underlie financial arrangements and therefore be 
applicable to possible cases of "positive abstention" or "opting out". The view is taken 
by a broad majority that the CFSP should be financed from the Community budget. For 
some members, this would imply the approval by the European Parliament of the broad 
outline of outlays related CFSP. 
164. The majority consider that the role of the European Parliament cannot be the same in this 
area as in Community legislation, since national parliaments do not use the same 
mechanisms of participation in framing and monitoring foreign policy as in their legislative 
work or in domestic control. However, some members think the present Treaty provisions 
should be better developed in practice, centring on the European Parliament's right to be 
informed in this respect. Others think it necessary to go further and involve Parliament 
more closely in determining the broad lines of the CFSP and in controlling the Union's 
external political affairs by means of arrangements in the Treaty ensuring confidentiality. 
Several members point out that the EP should not under any circumstances be given 
powers in this area in which governments conduct their foreign policy without prior 
authorization from Parliament, except in cases of extreme gravity. At least one member 
is against any increase in Parliament's role in this sphere. 
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165. lt is not easy to distinguish which of the above options can be achieved by means of 
simple, practical improvements in operation and which of them require amendment of the 
Treaties. In fact it will depend upon the degree of political will achieved at the 
Conference. The creation of an analysis unit does not in principle require amendment of 
the Treaty. Accordif11g to some, neither does the creation of a personality symbolizing the 
management of CFSp appear to require any institutional change. The question is whether 
the creation of such[ a personality does or does not in practice require the strengthening 
in the Treaty of consistency between Title V and the other functions of the Union. 
Furthermore, the best practical organization of the Presidency has its limits in Article 146 
of the Treaty. If it is not amended and special arrangements made for CFSP, the single 
institutional framework will necessarily have to be retained for all aspects of the Union. 
The Group recommends a global approach to assess the impact of each of these 
arrangements on the functions of the Union as a whole. 
C. SECURITY AND DEFENCE POLICY 
Elements for reflection 
166. The new international situation and prospects for enlargement lead to a more just and 
secure European order but also pose new challenges to the security of the Union. These 
challenges require a collective response to the new risks and crises which can affect 
Member States' se~urity. Their multifaceted nature calls also for a global approach 
ensuring consistency between the various aspects of the Union's external action, based 
on a comprehensivei concept of security. 
The Group therefore believes that the Conference could examine ways to further develop 
the European identity, including in the security and defence policy field. This development 
should proceed in conformity with the objectives agreed at Maastricht, taking into 
consideration the Treaty provisions that the CFSP shall include all questions related to the 
security of the Union, including the eventual framing of a common defence policy, which 
might in time lead to a common defence. 
167. Provisions of the TEU to be revised in 1996 also include those dealing with links with 
WEU, which is an integral part of the development of the Union. On 14.11.95 WEU 
Ministers approved and transmitted to the EU a WEU contribution to the IGC on the 
experience acquired since Maastricht (regarding both WEU's relations with the EU and with 
NATO and its operational development) and on the possible future development of the 
European Security and Defence Identity. In its reflection, the Group has been fully aware 
of this WEU work. 
168. Apart from the clas~ic collective defence of territorial integrity, the cooperation on security 
and defence matte~s which the new challenges require is also directed at preventing 
conflicts and man~ging regional crises which stem from a large variety of political, 
economic, ecologic~l, social or humanitarian factors. While both types of task may 
become intertwined in practice, it must also be pointed out that, as we shall see below, 
some Member States of the Union, which are not members of military alliances, wish to 
contribute to European security by participating in humanitarian, peacekeeping and other 
crisis management operations (the so-called Petersberg tasks), but without entering into 
collective defence commitments such as those defined in Art. 5 of the Brussels and 
Washington Treaties. These two facts will have to be taken into account when 
considering future arrangements for European security and defence cooperation. 
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169. In the view of many members of the Group, the gradual development of a European 
Security and Defence Identity agreed by the members of WEU at Maastricht must be given 
fresh impetus in order to establish the mechanisms permitting a European response to such 
crises, including through military operations to supplement the political, economic or 
humanitarian action decided on within the CFSP framework. 
170. The means needed for such European operations must be to hand: 
* Insofar as crises require a response including the use of armed force, fresh impetus must 
be given, according to WEU members, to developing further WEU's operational 
capabilities, which are still inadequate in many areas. This would also require that the 
procedures for making NATO assets and capabilities (including CJTF Headquarters) 
available for operations conducted by WEU be developed further. 
The EU "peace corps" suggested by some members of the Group (see above) could, were 
the idea to be accepted, play a role in this regard. Its relationship with existing or planned 
humanitarian capabilities, including those of WEU, would need to be considered. 
* The question also arises here of the need for greater European armaments cooperation. 
The Group was aware that thought is being given to this question within the Union, WEU 
and the WEAG. The Group discussed possible responses - including the proposed 
European Armaments Agency, the possible revision or even deletion of Article 223, and 
the need for a common arms export policy .. 
171. The Atlantic Alliance and the transatlantic link continue to play a fundamental role in 
European security. The Alliance guarantees the collective defence of its members and also 
contributes through other tasks to the security of the continent. For this reason, the 
Conference will have to take account of the fact that, in the view of NATO members, the 
development of a European Security and Defence Identity should strengthen the European 
pillar of the Atlantic Alliance and include a development of Euro-Atlantic relations. 
The prospect of an eastward enlargement implies qualitative as well as quantitative 
changes for the security and defence of the Union. The enlargement of the EU, WEU and 
NATO will proceed autonomously according to their respective internal dynamics and 
processes. Each organization should ensure that their respective processes are transparent 
and mutually supportive of the goal of enhancing European stability and security. 
172. Participation in military operations in the framework of the Petersberg tasks will remain a 
matter for national decision. The majority of members strongly feel that the principle of 
national sovereignty should continue to govern relations between European countries on 
defence matters and that the intergovernmental nature of decision-making on these issues 
should be preserved and be conducted on the basis of consensus. Some representatives 
consider that the consensus rule should not exclude the possibility of European 
supranational bodies playing a certain role in defence matters in the future. Others wish 
the IGC to consider all possible options in this respect, including majority-voting. 
In case present decision-making procedures are preserved, it would seem appropriate in 
the view of some members to introduce some element of flexibility in this sphere. To that 
end, the possibility has been suggested of applying a non-binding principle to the effect 
that, while no one can be obliged to take part in military action by the Union, neither 
should anyone prevent such action by a majority group of Member States, and this without 
prejudice to the required political solidarity and adequate financial burden sharing. 
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173. Some members, while indicating that the range of institutional options identified for future 
EU-WEU relations would be of assistance to the IGC negotiators, saw a need to identify 
at this stage the purposes and principles that should govern developments in this regard. 
In particular, in response to Europe's new security challenges, developing the Union's 
capabilities in such areas as conflict prevention, peacekeeping and humanitarian operations 
was identified as a priority. These members attached importance to the concern that all 
the Member States lot the Union, whether or not they are members of a military alliance, 
should be in a posiition to contribute to the European security through the Petersberg 
tasks. Some members of the Group also welcomed the fact that, in all of the options 
identified below, consideration was given to how to accommodate those partners not in 
a position to enter into Article V type commitments, and that the Group had examined 
ways to address this situation. 
Ootions for future EU-WEU relations 
174. Working from these general premises and taking note of Declaration 30 of Maastricht, the 
Group agrees on the need to continue improving the relationship between the EU and 
WEU, while fully respecting all Member States' national defence policies. In this context, 
the WEU Contribution to the IGC reaffirms the agreement of all WEU Member States to 
strengthen the EU-WEU institutional and operational links, together with WEU's operational 
capabilities. 
Nevertheless, differ~ent views have emerged within the Group (as in WEUl on how this 
relationship should be developed in the future. In this respect, a number of options and 
modalities have beer put forward in the Group's discussion, although most representatives 
were open to consider several interrelated options. 
175. One view advocates maintaining full autonomy of WEU in the foreseeable future. 
According to this view, such autonomy allows maximum flexibility for participation by all 
Member States in developing the European Security and Defence Identity and avoids 
weakening the defence commitments within NATO and WEU, taking into account the 
differing memberships of these organizations and the Union. 
In this context, the option of an EU-WEU "reinforced partnership" has been proposed, 
aimed both at establishing closer political (EU/WEU back-to-back Summits) and 
administrative relations (coordination of Presidencies and Secretariats) between the two 
organizations and at developing WEU operational capabilities for crisis management tasks 
to complement NATO, while allowing for participation in such tasks of the widest possible 
range of European States. 
176. Another view advocates a greater role of the Union in the Petersberg tasks while at the 
same time preserving WEU as a separate defence organization. The development of 
operational capabilities necessary for the implementation of these tasks would proceed as 
a matter of urgenqy in view of Europe's new challenges. Two options have been 
mentioned in this cpntext: 
I 
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* An option which would provide for a closer and more formal link between both 
organizations by means of either political or legally binding directives. WEU would be 
subordinate in the Petersberg area to the Union, so as to act as its executive arm. 
* An alternative option would be to fully transfer the Petersberg tasks from WEU to the EU. 
WEU would remain as an organization responsible for territorial defence together with 
NATO. 
177. The majority of representatives see the way to the establishment of a genuine European 
Security and Defence Identity as lying in the gradual integration of WEU into the EU, in 
parallel with the development of European operational capabilities. In this way, the 
European defence function (both for crisis management tasks and for the collective 
defence guarantee embodied at present in the Brussels Treaty) would in time be 
incorporated into the single institutional framework of the Union. According to this view, 
EU-WEU integration responds to the logic of Maastricht, would reflect the solidarity 
amongst Europeans (which cannot be solely confined to the economic sphere) and would 
be the best way to achieve coherence between the CFSP and the defence policy, thereby 
allowing for better coordination between the various instruments of crisis management 
(political, economic, humanitarian, as well as military) available for effective action by the 
Union in crisis situations such as that of the former Yugoslavia. In this context, the idea 
has also been put forward within the Group that the IGC examines the possibility of 
including in the revised Treaty a provision on mutual assistance for the defence of the 
external borders of the Union. 
This view admits various approaches on the timetable and stages for WEU-EU integration: 
* Some regard integration as feasible only in the medium term. They therefore consider that 
the IGC should pursue an "intermediate" option which, while preserving the autonomous 
existence of WEU, would establish measures to promote a EU-WEU institutional 
convergence, with full integration as the final goal. This would be achieved by means of 
some political or legal commitment whereby WEU would be subordinated to the EU in 
matters concerning the operational-military elaboration and implementation of EU decisions 
and actions (Petersberg tasks), so as to act as implementing body of the Union in this 
area, while maintaining the possibility of WEU deciding autonomously its own actions. 
Three possible ways of establishing this commitment have been suggested: A new Article 
J.4 (and a new WEU Declaration) could state that the European Council will address 
general guidelines to WEU, as the organization requested to implement through the 
appropriate military actions the follow-up decisions adopted by the EU at ministerial level. 
Or it could state that the EU will address concrete instructions to WEU, thereby expressing 
its political and operational subordination to the Union. Finally, it could also be envisaged 
that a legally binding EU/WEU agreement be established whereby WEU would be 
committed to implementing decisions of the Union with defence implications. 
* Others consider that the IGC should clearly establish the goal and timetable for a WEU-EU 
merger in the short term (bearing in mind the possibility of denouncing the Brussels Treaty 
after 1998). WEU would thus disappear and the present duplication of structures for 
security (CFSP) and defence in the broad sense (WEU) would be eliminated. 
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The modalities for this integration could be decided on by the IGC or at a later moment. 
One possibility would be to transfer all WEU functions and capabilities from WEU to the 
Second Pillar (defence function within the CFSP); Member States not willing or able to 
enter into a collective defence commitment could opt out of such commitment. Another, 
initially more feasibl~, modality of integration, would be for the CFSP to take on the crisis 
management functions (Petersberg tasks) but leave the collective defence guarantee to a 
Defence Protocol to which those Member States so desiring would opt in on conditions 
to be agreed. 
Those who advocate the gradual integration of WEU into the EU consider, furthermore, 
that all these modalities could be seen as complementary measures and that the IGC could 
therefore envisage their being carried out either separately or as successive phases of a 
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